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12 AUGUST 1986

Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL

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12 AUGUST 1986

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

SOVIET COMMENTATORS CRITICIZE WEINBERGER ST. LOUIS SPEECH

Sergey Pravdin Commentary

LD201931 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 20 Jul 86

[Text] According to a report by AP, U.S. Secretary of Defense Weinberger, speaking in St. Louis, said he was in favor of the accelerated implementation by the United States of the so-called SDI. As the Pentagon boss put it, the basis for successfully implementing plans for preparation for "star wars" is the close partnership between the administration and the military-industrial complex. Here is a news commentary, Sergey Pravdin is at the microphone:

There is no need to doubt that Weinberger is well aware of all the details of this partnership. The Pentagon annually publishes lists of the corporations that execute its orders, including those associated with preparations for "star wars", and every year essentially the same names figure in them. Listed among the Pentagon's main contractors are General Dynamics, Grumman, Lockheed, McDonnell Douglas, and another dozen and a half major companies.

By the way, since the current administration came to power, the largest and most profitable orders fall more and more often into the lap of the so-called Californian group, the owners of major corporations in that state. There is no reason to be surprised here for President Reagan and many members of his so-called team actually began their political careers in California. The U.S. Administration and the military-industrial complex do not simply cooperate with each other. As the PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER notes, there recently has been a significant intensification of the process of their merging.

Many current figures in the administration arrived -- or more precisely were invited by the head of the White House -- in Washington departments from private big business. In their turn, many former officials, having served out their allotted time, or simply having spoiled their reputations in some or other illegal affair, occupy high posts on the boards of their corporations or banks. Sitting on these boards now are over 400 former highly-placed military officials. In the United States the administration is frequently called a government by the rich for the rich. In the current U.S. cabinet, approximately half of the secretaries have assets close to or exceeding \$1 million. It is natural that the implementation of the SDI promises no mean dividends both for the U.S. military-industrial complex and for many representatives of the administration itself.

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But on the path to preparations for "star wars" and intensifying the arms race, there is now a broad antinuclear and antimissile movement growing: This was, by the way, admitted by Weinberger in his St. Louis speech. The people of the world are conscious of what great danger lurks in the current arms race being whipped up by the United States and especially in its transfer into outer space.

TASS Report

LD181636 Moscow TASS in English 1545 GMT 18 Jul 86

[Text] Washington July 18 TASS -- Speaking at the World Affairs Council in St. Louis (Missouri) and trying to justify Washington's course towards space militarization, Defense Secretary Weinberger cynically said: "The promise of strategic defense is far too valuable to give up or to bargain away". Washington sees the "value" of this programme, first of all, in creating a "space shield" which will provide the USA with a chance for the first nuclear strike with impunity.

At the same time the Pentagon head admitted with irritation that the number of people protesting against the U.S. plans of developing strike space weapons was growing in the world. "There are many who oppose this program and frankly, the arguments of SDI critics baffle me," he said. However, the secretary intimated that, despite the demands of the public, the administration intended, in future too, to give priority attention to the "star wars" programme.

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SOVIET COLONEL CRITICIZES U.S. 'SPACE ILLUSIONS'

PM211041 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Jul 86 Single Edition p 3

[Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Borin article: "Washington's Space Illusions"]

[Text] All pretense of love for peace has been abandoned. "The madmen have won in the White House" -- this is how Paul Warnke, former leader of the U.S. delegation at the strategic arms limitation talks, described the U.S. President's statement concerning the refusal to observe the 1972 Interim Agreement (SALT I) and the 1979 treaty on the Limiting Offensive Strategic Arms (SALT II).

This statement by the chief of the White House, which poses a threat to the future of all mankind, is not accidental or isolated episode. It is yet another link in the chain of Washington's ambitious attempts to gain unilateral military superiority over the USSR by means of unrestrained arms buildup. The implementation of the "program for the strategic forces' modernization to its full extent" and the simultaneous "implementation of the Strategic Defense Initiative" remain of paramount importance for the United States in the immediate future, the U.S. President's statement says.

Washington's claims about the "exclusively defensive" purpose of the weapons system planned to be deployed in space within the SDI framework are false through and through. U.S. scientists have repeatedly refuted this thesis. The space-strike weapons being developed [razrabatyvayemye] under the "star wars" program are capable of attacking any target in outer space and, possibly, even on the territory of other countries, Director Bowman of the Institute for the Study of Outer Space Problems, points out.

The U.S. Administration's assurance that SDI's purpose, in conceptual terms, is to ultimately free mankind from the nuclear threat, also appear more than dubious. Under no circumstances will the implementation of the "star wars" plan lead to deliverance from nuclear weapons, just like the appearance of nuclear weapons themselves did not lead to the liquidation of conventional weapons. On the contrary, the deployment of all kinds of lasers, electromagnetic guns, and other "exotic" weapons in circumterrestrial space by the United States, and the creation [sozdaniye] of an ABM defense for the country's territory on that basis will inevitably lead to an uncontrollable nuclear arms race.

This is also recognized by official Washington. "The SDI," Secretary of Defense Weinberger declared, "never envisaged a rejection of nuclear strategy. While creating [sozdavaya] a strategic defense, the United States does not intend to reject nuclear deterrence but, on the contrary, to strengthen it even further." The Pentagon chief's subordinates Perle and Cooper, who are not exactly unknown, make it clear: Nuclear forces will apparently remain the basis of U.S. security even after the creation [sozdaniye] of a large-scale ABM system with space-based elements.

It is well known that nuclear weapons constitute the basis of a number of space-strike systems being created [sozdavayemye] within the SDI framework. Their development [razrabotka] is underway at the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory in Livermore. Moreover, we are not at all talking about "innocent" scientific research measures. The third generation of nuclear mass destruction weapons is being created [sozdayetsya] here. According to THE WASHINGTON POST data, these weapons will differ from existing ones by the fact that the energy produced during a nuclear explosion will be transformed basically into microwave x-rays or gamma radiation that can be focused on a distant target. Trials of a nuclear source of energy for the x-ray laser are being conducted at the Nevada nuclear testing ground.

By hatching plans to deploy nuclear weapons in space, the United States is jeopardizing the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. The states that signed this international agreement (it came into force back on 10 October 1967) pledged not to place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, the treaty prohibits the establishment [sozdaniye] of military bases, installations, and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons, and the conduct of military maneuvers in outer space (Article IV). The pledge "not to develop [sozdavat], test, or deploy" systems or components of space-based ABM defense is also entrenched in Article V of the Soviet-U.S. ABM Treaty (1972).

The report on key issues of U.S. security, prepared not so long ago by a special commission under Scowcroft's leadership, bluntly points out: The United States must continue its course of militarization of space. This document claims that the installation [osnashcheniye] of weapons in space has already begun (naturally, exclusively through "the Russians' fault") and that it is virtually impossible to halt this process. Hence both a "nuclear sword" and a "space shield" are vitally necessary for the United States.

People across the ocean continue to evaluate the contemporary international situation in terms of "star wars" and nuclear warheads. Under the present circumstances this may produce irreparable consequences. It is necessary to curb the tendency toward a buildup of military danger and to turn international relations back along the tracks of detente. Mankind can and must raise a barrier across the path to nuclear catastrophe.

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TASS: U.S. ASAT PROGRAM ANOTHER STEP IN ESCALATION

LD231133 Moscow TASS in English 1110 GMT 23 Jul 86

[Text] Moscow July 23 TASS -- Follows commentary by Vladimir Chernyshev, a TASS military writer:

At the round of Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons, which has recently closed, the USSR proposed to the United States that an agreement be reached on partial measures which could be taken already now and each of which would make a weighty contribution to resolving the task of preventing a militarisation of outer space. Among these measures is a ban on anti-satellite systems.

Yet, it is clear already now that this proposal does not suit the Pentagon's book. An evidence of that is the statement just made by Robert Sims, a spokesman for the U.S. Defence Department. According to the latter, the Pentagon will insist on continuing work in the field of creating anti-satellite weapons according to the ASAT programme. In his words, three tests of such weapons against orbital targets have been planned for the 1987 fiscal year. The Pentagon's persistent wish to carry on the testing of anti-satellite weapons is by no means accidental. In the first place, perfection of the methods of combatting satellites is directly linked with the implementation of the "star wars" programme. In the opinion of many experts, there is a real opportunity to create components of space-strike weapons, using the ASAT programme.

Second, the development and testing of anti-satellite weapons makes it possible to develop anti-ballistic missile technology even in conditions of the restrictions envisaged by the ABM Treaty, i.e. the ASAT programme is some kind of a "loophole" for evasion by the United States of that highly important treaty. And, at last, third, from the strategic viewpoint, the anti-satellite weapons are in themselves a means capable of undermining the capability of the other side to launch retaliatory strikes. They create a threat to satellites providing early warning on missile launchings and to communication in emergency conditions. In 1984-1985, the Pentagon three times launched interceptor missiles, one of them on a real target in outer space. According to a statement by Congressman George Brown, after another two successful tests, the Air Force could announce that the system is ready for being adopted among the arms and start its full-scale deployment.

The intensification of the ASAT programme would be another step in the escalation of the arms race, its spreading into outer space, would constitute an action leading directly to the start of deployment of a new class of dangerous weapons -- the space weapons. Also noteworthy is another highly important fact. The U.S. Administration is making efforts to carry on the dangerous weapons tests in outer space at a time when the Soviet Union's unilateral commitment not to put anti-satellite systems into outer space has been in effect for three years now. This is a fresh manifestation of Washington's unpreparedness and reluctance to reach agreement on real steps to prevent arms race in outer space and end it on earth.

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TASS REPORT ON CD OUTER SPACE SPECIAL COMMITTEE SESSION

LD171940 Moscow TASS in English 1908 GMT 17 Jul 86

[Text] Geneva, July 17 TASS--TASS correspondent Vladislav Shishlo reporting:

Everything should be done to prevent weapons from making their way to outer space.

This is the manifest wish of an overwhelming majority of members of the international community, as evidenced by the debate in the Special Committee for the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space of the Conference on Disarmament. The committee has completed the discussion of the existing agreements on outer space.

Representatives of socialist states, neutral and nonaligned countries came out in favor of preserving and strengthening the peaceful status of outer space. In their speeches they made note of the important and the timely character of the existing agreements, primarily, the Soviet-American ABM treaty. It was also emphasized that the existing norms of international law were clearly insufficient for putting up a stout barrier in the way of the militarization of space. The speakers also pointed out to the need for drafting new multilateral agreements that could effectively block off all possible ways for projecting the arms race to space.

Statements made by the U.S. delegation which in essence expressed opposition to the strengthening of the regime of peaceful uses of outer space under international law were in a sharp contrast with the opinion of a majority of delegates. The reason for such a stand is obvious -- the conclusion of new multilateral agreements on space would emphatically underscore the illegal character of the U.S. "star wars" plans.

Moreover, instead of discussing the question of preventing an arms race in space U.S. representatives tried hard to make the committee discuss the question of control over its militarization. Such a stand, as delegates of neutral and nonaligned countries rightfully noted, comes as a direct violation of the status of the special committee reflected in its very name.

Representatives of Algeria, Venezuela, India, Mexico, Sri Lanka and other countries rejected U.S. attempts at preserving loopholes for putting weapons in outer space. They emphasized the need of transferring the talks on space into the practical plane with the aim of drafting concrete agreements on the prevention of the militarization of space.

The demands for preventing the emplacement of weapons in space were also made at the plenary meeting of the conference today. All efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate nuclear weapons on earth will be doomed to failure if they are not supplemented by relevant agreements on the prevention of the militarization of outer space, said Herald Hinteregger, secretary-general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Austria.

The delegation of Canada, too, came out in favor of imparting a practical character to the discussions at the conference of questions of preventing an arms race in space.

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SOVIET ACADEMICIAN REBUTS U.S. CLAIMS OF SOVIET SDI RESEARCH

PM221031 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Jul 86 Morning Edition p 5

["Expert Opinion" by Aleksey Vasilyev, chief of the Military-Political Problems Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences United States of America and Canada Institute: "Shifting the Blame..." -- first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] In the attempt to justify plans to take the arms race into space, Washington constantly claims that the Soviet Union has been actively engaged since the seventies in developing [razrabotka] an ABM system analogous to that being developed [razrabatyvayetsya] in the United States within the framework of the SDI program. The U.S. President used this same "argument" in his routine "radio address to the nation" on 12 July. We asked a Soviet expert to comment on this statement -- Aleksey Vasilyev, chief of the Military-Political Problems Department at the USSR Academy of Sciences United States of America and Canada Institute and holder of a USSR State Prize.

[Vasilyev] The President said nothing new. We have often heard the fairytale that the USSR has been working for nearly 20 years on a program analogous to the American SDI, whereas the United States embarked on its program only after nearly 15 years of "neglecting the interests of state security." And not only in connection with SDI. We have also heard about the U.S. "lag" in bombers, in ICBM's, in medium-range nuclear systems... It seems that this has become the stereotype in American policy -- to begin each new round of the arms race with the hysterical cry "the Russians are coming!"

The President is doubly wrong. He is wrong in stating that the USSR is working on its own program analogous to SDI. It is also untrue that it was only in 1983 that the United States "awoke from many years of slumber."

It has repeatedly been reported in our country that the USSR is not working on such systems. It is not doing so, and it calls on the United States to follow its example. It is well-known that Soviet proposals that entirely exclude the appearance of weapons in space are on the conference table in Geneva.

In our country scientific research work is taking place, including work in the military sphere. But it is not aimed at creating [sozdaniye] space-strike weapons, it is concerned with improving space early warning, reconnaissance, communications, and navigation systems.

We are not creating space-strike weapons or an ABM defense of the country's territory. The USSR adheres firmly to the unlimited-duration 1972 treaty.

Yes, an ABM system is deployed around our capital. We have never denied it -- the existence is strictly in accordance with the ABM Treaty. Mobile complexes or multiple warhead launchers are not being created here, nor are the quantitative limitations being violated. The improvement of the Moscow ABM system is carried out strictly within the treaty limits. Incidentally, the United States too has an analogous system, and although people there claim that it has been "mothballed," it is known that its radar station is in working order and is in operation.

Now for the American efforts in the sphere of ABM systems. The United States has never stopped work on their creation. The first steps were taken in the postwar years, when German military experts switched masters and went to work across the ocean. In all, from the beginning of the fifties through March 1983, when President Reagan made his famous "star wars" speech, the United States, according to the calculations of the Federation of American Scientists, had spent \$40 billion on the development [razrabotka] of ABM systems. The influx of dollars never stopped, and the size of this sum and its continuing growth speak for themselves and convincingly refute the thesis that the United States "forgot," even for a while, about this avenue of arms development. The programs on which the Pentagon was working before the President's "star wars" speech were practically the same. The commencement of work on SDI did not mean a transition from inaction to action, but a sharp intensification of already considerable efforts.

The meaning of the President's utterance is extremely clear. Washington realizes that the new stage in the arms race that begins with the space echelons cannot be justified by any weighty arguments. The Soviet program for the total elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000 took the ground out from under SDI. So they launched their justifications in the spirit of "They started first..." Such, frankly, kindergarten arguments cannot be used when you are talking about something as serious as the security of mankind.

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MOSCOW TV: PROFITS REAL REASON FOR SDI 'PHANTASMAGORIA'

LD222047 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 22 Jul 86

[USSR television political observer Valentin Zorin commentary; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Hello, comrades. At first glance, events taking place in the U.S. capital at the present moment to do with the so-called SDI program may appear somehow unreal, a political phantasmagoria. All the arguments being put forward by the many opponents of SDI not only talk, but cry out against attempts to start practical implementation of the star wars program. Even so, these arguments in a very mysterious way hang in mid-air. The White House somehow does not hear them, and yet they are more than mere sound.

Above all, they draw attention to the great, incomparable danger for humanity connected with transferring the arms race to space. Important scientists, including U.S. scientists, assert that the present level of human knowledge does not enable the construction of an effective, and more to the point, an in any way reliable space system which the present Washington leaders are publicizing. And finally, there are the senseless expenditures that do not at all guarantee the achievement of the desired effect. The situation that has arisen so worries the U.S. public that almost half the members of the Senate -- 46 out of 100 -- oppose the star wars program. In spite of this, and it would seem in opposition to reason and common sense, the Washington administration is not only defending its idea, but is already trying to get it to the stage of practical implementation.

Why? What is behind this stubborn desire on the part of the White House incumbents not to face incontrovertible facts? It is perhaps one of the most fatal riddles of present-day Washington. However, there is a very definite answer of primitive simplicity to this puzzling riddle. It is essentially the following: During the past 30 years or so, U.S. military concerns have lived on profit from the production of modern nuclear missile armaments. But now, the potential of such military orders is on the wane.

So many weapons of this generation have been produced that according to specialists there are enough major military problems for another 3 to 4 years and longer. And this or that improvement of existing systems and the development of various modifications will not ensure the previous profit levels. Given this situation, U.S. military-industrial concerns had to find, think-up, create, something totally new, and at the same time on such a scale that it would guarantee them large-scale profits, and not once-only profits but long-term ones.

This was how the idea of a huge new military program covered by the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative came to be. Neither the interests of international security and deliverance from the nuclear threat, nor, at the very least, stimulation of technical progress, lie at its base, but the mercenary interests of the U.S. military-political elite. And the present Washington administration is prepared to sacrifice to these interests not only considerations of common sense and political realism, but also the interests of peace and security of the people, including the U.S. people.

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TASS: FRENCH DEFENSE MINISTER DISCUSSES SDI IN WASHINGTON

Meets with Weinberger

LD031524 Moscow TASS in English 1412 GMT 3 Jul 86

[Text] Washington, 3 July (TASS)--French Defense Minister Andre Giraud, who is currently on a visit in the USA, held talks with U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger. They discussed among other things questions pertaining to military cooperation and arms sales.

Addressing a press conference, the French defense minister said that the French Government was "very likely" to purchase the U.S. AWACS radio-direction finding and warning system. He declared in favor of "even closer cooperation" with Britain, the FRG and other NATO allies in developing weapons.

Yet the minister pointed out that France intended to pursue an independent policy in the military field, albeit with due regard for the fact that France is a NATO member.

Touching upon the U.S. "star wars" program, Andre Giraud said that the French Government did not intend to change its stand on that issue. Until now France has refused to take an official part in that program, but did not prohibit its companies to cooperate with the USA in that field.

Holds Press Conference

LD032103 Moscow TASS in English 1936 GMT 3 Jul 86

[Text] Washington, 3 July (TASS)--The U.S. administration is continuing attempts to harness the scientific, technological and economic potential of its allies to push plans for developing space strike weapons.

With this aim it exerted strong pressure on French Defense Minister Andre Giraud who had arrived in Washington on an official visit. One of the main topics at the U.S.-French talks, according to news agencies' reports, was prospects for French participation in the "star wars" program.

Speaking at a news conference after meetings with U.S. counterpart Caspar Weinberger, Lieutenant-General James Abrahamson, director of the "Strategic

Defense Initiative" organization, and Undersecretary of Defense Fred Ikle, Giraud summarized the position of the French Government on the issue, which is, in the opinion of observers, of a dual nature.

On the one hand, he said, the new French Government does not intend to change the standpoint on the issue. So far France has been against official involvement in the SDI effort, though it has not prohibited its companies to cooperate with the United States in the field.

On the other hand, the French defense minister, the Associated Press reported, supported the Reagan administration's SDI effort. He claimed that testing under the program is "pure research" and "conforms" with the Soviet-U.S. ABM Treaty of 1972.

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TASS CITES FRENCH PREMIER'S REMARKS ON SDI

LD221124 Moscow TASS in English 1117 GMT 22 Jul 86

[Excerpt] Paris, July 22 (TASS)--Jacques Chirac has held his first news conference here since taking the French prime ministerial office.

Speaking of international problems, he said that "any development of East-West dialogue is positive in advance". In this connection he said he attached much importance to Soviet-U.S. dialogue.

Commenting on the U.S. "Strategic Defense Initiative", Chirac claimed that research into the military uses of outer space was "inevitable" and should be seen as a logical development of technology in the world. France which is the world's major space power, should not, in his words, fall behind technological progress in space exploration or close the eyes to the modernization of the entire strategic approach to military problems in the world.

Chirac said he and President Francois Mitterrand had certain differences in their views on the military use of outer space. The president, he said, had a less favourable attitude to the idea of a space defense, though the latter, "as a concept, has not found complete support also on my part".

Chirac agreed with Mitterrand that the French Government should not be officially involved in the U.S. SDI program. He also spoke for an agreement to be reached between the USSR and the United States on the space issue.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR: JAPAN'S DECISION TO PARTICIPATE IN SDI ATTACKED

'Diplomatic Complications' Foreseen

LD181704 Moscow TASS in English 1527 GMT 18 Jul 86

[Text] Moscow July 18 TASS -- TASS political news analyst Askold Biryukov writes:

The Japanese Government has actually decided to join in the U.S. "star wars" programme. A meeting of the six leading members of the cabinet ministers responsible for the branches affected by the joining to the SDI, was held in Tokyo today with Prime Minister Nakasone in the chair. The decision adopted by the meeting will give the green light to Japanese corporations for the participation in creating space strike arms. The door is left open for the participation in the SDI of state research institutions.

The present decision is a direct result of the victory of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party at the latest parliamentary elections. Already in the first days after that event, the Japanese press predicted that the strengthening of the Liberal Democratic Party's positions in the country's legislative body will make it easier for the government to adopt the decision on Japan's joining in the "star wars" programme.

No matter how the Japanese ruling circles might explain the decision on the country's joining in Washington's plans for the militarisation of space, it is clear that Japan's scientific and technological potential will be serving the aims of speeding up the rates of the United States' development of weapons for "star wars" that is fraught with unpredictable consequences for humanity.

A spokesman for Japan's foreign policy department, commenting on the government's stand asserted that it must not cause any complications on a diplomatic plane. But this assertion can hardly convince anyone. The decision adopted means that acting together with the USA in the militarisation of space; Japan will violate the treaties it has signed, including the treaty on the peaceful use of outer space, the United Nations resolution on the prevention of the arms race in space, for which it voted in the autumn of 1984, to say nothing of Japan's violation of its fundamental law, the basic principles that were proclaimed by the previous governments and that determined Japan's policy in the past.

Tokyo's assistance to Washington in the implementation of the SDI will be promoting the arms race, will be hampering the advance along the road of nuclear disarmament, will be undermining international confidence and dialogue and be leading to the heightening of international tension.

In the opinion of sane scientists and politicians, including those in Japan, the creation of space strike arms, in which Japan's corporations will now be openly involved, will not make nuclear weapons "obsolete and impotent", as they in Washington assert, but will only increase the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war. The creation of space strike arms will not strengthen anyone's security. It has nothing to do with the needs of Japan's security which can be ensured only by preventing the emplacement of armaments in space and by nuclear disarmament.

Japanese Opposition Reported

OW192000 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1045 GMT 18 Jul 86

[From the "World Today" program presented by Vladimir Tsvetov]

[Text] A routine session of the special council of chiefs of main government administrations was held in Tokyo today. The session, presided over by Prime Minister Nakasone, discussed the issue of Japan joining the so-called U.S. SDI, that is, preparations for star wars.

The session participants spoke very definitely in favor of private Japanese firms participating in SDI, but refrained from being just as definite concerning the participation of government organs in the SDI.

Yet there are quite a number of signs that the government will join the space weapons race that is so extremely dangerous for the world and mankind. First of all, Prime Minister Nakasone himself is an admirer of the SDI. Japanese big business intends to make a good profit from its participation in it.

Extreme Japanese reactionaries are counting on skipping the nuclear arms stage with the aid of the SDI, as those weapons are prohibited by Japanese laws. Minister of International Trade and Industry Michio Watanabe's statement is highly significant in this connection. He said: If Japan decides to participate in SDI it will do so both at the government and private levels.

Japanese scientists have a different opinion about participation in SDI. The International "expo-85" exhibition was held there last year. On 13 July the campaign was joined by 1,200 scientists from universities and scientific centers of Nagoya, where Japanese machinebuilding and automobile manufacturing are concentrated. The movement was then joined by scientists from Hiroshima. Professor Sanaya Matsuzaki, leader of the movement, said that SDI is an arms race program and hinders the achievement of a ban on nuclear weapons.

'Discredits' Peace Commitment

OW201325 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1351 GMT 19 Jul 86

[Dmitriyev commentary]

[Text] According to the KYODO news agency, Japanese cabinet members responsible for determining Japan's stand on its participation in the U.S. SDI program held a meeting the other day and virtually confirmed Japan's readiness to participate in the efforts to militarize space. In this connection, Dmitriyev, Radio Moscow's commentator, writes as follows:

It seems that certain circles among the Japanese political leadership regard the outcome of the recent elections as the people's approval to step up war preparations. For example, the Defense Agency, immediately after the elections, demanded that military spending for the next year be increased by more than 7 percent. Later it was announced that Japan would actually participate in the star wars program.

This announcement greatly discredits Japan's commitment to peace as set forth in Japanese Government statements. It renders invalid the important documents on Japan's major policies, including the Diet decision on the peaceful use of space as well as on the three nonnuclear principles. The fact that Japan's ruling circles virtually abandon the responsibility they have voluntarily taken upon themselves has caused people to doubt the sincerity of Japan's statement on its stand of cooperating with other countries in promoting nuclear disarmament.

Because of the nature of SDI, support for this program is tantamount to support for nuclear armament. The space militarization program is a program for nuclear armament. It is for the purpose of developing offensive space weapons that the United States has been conducting nuclear tests in Nevada while the USSR has been implementing its unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests. Furthermore, SDI is an aggressive program. It cannot guarantee the defense of Japan, not to mention the defense of the United States itself. Of course, the deployment of U.S. strategic missiles can guarantee only part of its defense at the most. This has been confirmed by U.S. experts engaged in the SDI program.

Thus, SDI is nothing but a measure to strengthen the U.S. nuclear offensive force. It is certainly not an omnipotent system that can avert a nuclear attack on Washington claims. The SDI's only purpose is to guarantee the United States' military superiority over the USSR. All unilateral actions inevitably invite countermeasures by the other side. The star wars program is no exception.

First of all, the star wars program has dealt a blow to the hopes cherished by the peoples of various countries for nuclear disarmament, and has become a strong force in pushing the nuclear arms race to a new stage. By announcing its decision to participate in the SDI program, the Japanese Government will be partly responsible, regardless of its own will, for the consequences of the nuclear arm race, no matter how terrible they may be. Taking this fact into account, it is impossible to regard as sincere the assertion that the implementation of the star wars program will have no impact at all on the world's political environment or on relations between the various countries. According to the Japanese press, however, such an assertion is being made by Japan's political leaders. Even though they do not believe it, they try to make the people believe it.

The USSR has a different view on this issue. Recently the spokesman of the Soviet Foreign Ministry stated explicitly that the military cooperation between Japan and the United States and Japan's participation in the U.S. adventurist actions will certainly not be conducive to strengthening peace in the Far East. Military actions taken in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Security Pact have made the situation unstable and inevitably aroused apprehensions among the USSR and other countries in Asia. No doubt, Japan's participation in the Pentagon's anti-Soviet nuclear program will arouse similar apprehensions among neighboring countries. The first direct consequence of Japan's participation in the star wars program will be aggravation of the prospects for easing tensions in Asia.

/12858

CSO: 5200/1489

12 August 1986

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

BULGARIAN SCIENTISTS ANALYZE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE DANGERS

Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in Bulgarian 7, 8, 10 May 86

[Article by Prof, Dr Matey Mateyev, Docent Ivan Zakhariev and Science Associate G. Stanev: "Star Wars -- Desires, Reality and Dangers"]

[7 May 1986, p 4]

[Text] From the moment of the development of nuclear weapons by the United States, mankind has been living in a constant threat of destruction. The destructive force of the offensive weapons is colossal and makes defenses useless and even dangerous. Yes, in actuality a defense makes sense only if it can guarantee that over 95 percent of the enemy nuclear strike will be deflected. As we will show below, the Star Wars project not only does not provide a guarantee for this but also greatly increases the risk of error.

The achieved equilibrium based upon guaranteed retaliation was set out in the 1972 Soviet-American Treaty on Limiting the Antimissile Defense Systems. But such an equilibrium could not be sustained infinitely. It was essential for mankind to find a political solution to the situation which had arisen and as quickly as possible. An expression of such a view was the Soviet program proposed by Mikhail Gorbachev to eliminate the nuclear threat prior to the year 2000. The readiness of the Soviet Union was also demonstrated by the accepting of the obligation not to launch the first nuclear strike and by the announcing of a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. Instead of seeking a political solution to these vitally important questions for all mankind, President Reagan in his speech of 23 March 1983 launched the idea of a space shield, that is, an attempt to find a scientific-technical solution. (The speech itself was not preceded by any serious scientific-technical study on the part of independent experts. Only after this was the group of James Fletcher established who was the previous and recently reappointed administrator of NASA. This group was instructed to make an optimum research program for implementing the project but not to study its advisability, applicability and consequences.)

Is Such a Decision Possible?

Will this truly mean peace for mankind or, conversely, a great and dangerous illusion? Is any system of antimissile defense capable of guaranteeing

security and will this stop the arms race? The scientists and specialists have been urged to provide an answer to these questions before it becomes too late and the equilibrium becomes perpetually unstable.

Here we will set out the concept of the strategic defense initiative (SDI) which has been formulated in physical scientific circles and described by well known scientists. Particular confidence must be given to the assessments of the Nobel Prize winner Hans Bethe, a participant in the development of the atomic bomb at the Los Alamos Laboratory. The ruling circles in the United States must show utmost seriousness to the fact that he, along with colleagues, reached a negative assessment of the SDI.

Aims of the SDI Project

The ambitious goal of the proposed project is to defend all objects: military including launching silos, radar installations, command centers and so forth, as well as civilian including population points, communications centers, power systems and so forth. For this reason it is essential to destroy all or at least 95 percent of the attacking warheads.

Let us examine the movement of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and the capability of destroying the warhead. The trajectory of the ICBM can be arbitrarily divided into three stages. The first is the "propulsion" which lasts 2-3 minutes and is the time during which the engines fire. Because of this the ICBM can be comparatively easily spotted from the infrared radiation. The second stage, known as the "middle" or "intermediate" lasts 20-25 minutes (this time depends upon the distance between the launch pad and the target and is the most approximate. It can be much shorter if they employ ICBM located on submarines and aircraft). During this time the individually-targeted warheads of each ICBM move very close to one another. Also traveling in this same cluster are the dummy warheads which do not differ from the live ones in terms of reflective characteristics but have no charge, as well as the metallized balloons, foil strips and so forth. The third stage which is arbitrarily called "atmospheric" lasts 2-5 minutes. The warheads are aimed at the targets while the dummy ones fall far behind due to their lower weight (for example, 1 kg) and the resistance of the atmosphere.

Understandably, the warheads can be destroyed most easily during the last stage and for precisely this reason the presently existing systems are of this type. The separation of the warheads from the dummy ones significantly reduces the number of targets while the proximity of the developed systems both of "ground-to-air" missiles or other ground-base means as well as from aircraft and "air-to-air" missiles make them much more vulnerable. But these systems have one essential shortcoming. Due to the closeness of the target, it is very difficult to make second or third attempts at destruction if the first is a failure. According to the existing agreement between the USSR and the United States concerning the number of missiles, the two countries have the actual possibility of firing approximately 1,400 ICBM simultaneously. Hence, a protective system operating only in the last stage cannot handle all the warheads and correspondingly does not meet the tasks posed by the SDI.

The intermediate stage is the longest but the combating of the ICBM in this instance runs into two major difficulties. The first is that the targets are significantly harder to pick up than in the propulsion and atmospheric stages. The second is that very successful measures can be taken to conceal the warheads. For example, it is possible to release aerosols which radiate in the infrared range and divert the missiles from the real targets. The number of dummy warheads can reach up to 100 for each ICBM and no system can handle so many targets. The most suitable stage from the viewpoint of the SDI is the propulsion one. This is due to the comparatively small number of targets, as well as the ease of identifying and destroying the ICBM close to the launch silos. Since the Star Wars strategists obstinately view the USSR as the aggressor, they plan destroying the targets over Soviet territory and not over American territory and this obviously will not be without importance. For this period there is one serious difficulty, namely the shortness of the active period. This leads to very high demands both on the weapons as well as on the systems involved in surveillance, identification, guidance and decision taking. It will immediately be understood that while for the other two layers of defense the weapons and surveillance systems can be located on the earth or above American territory, this is fundamentally impossible for destroying the ICBM in the propulsion stage. It is essential that these systems be widely deployed in space.

[8 May 1986, p 4]

[Text] The Space Arsenal

Space weapons can be divided into two types: kinetic and direct. The kinetic weapons are those in which the energy needed to destroy the target reaches it through a carrier. The energy can be nuclear such as a nuclear explosion which destroys an entire cloud of warheads or chemical such as a conventional explosion or shell, that is, operating through the very kinetic energy of the object.

Experiments with kinetic weapons have been conducted over the last several years. In June 1984, a dummy warhead was destroyed by a non-exploding homing ballistic missile launched from the earth. In September 1985, the first experiment was run to destroy a satellite. As the target they employed the P78-1 satellite of the U.S. Air Force while the missile was launched from an aircraft. The time of destroying the target with kinetic weapons is determined by the speed of the carrier and is on the order of minutes.

With direct weapons the destructive energy is carried directly by the laser beam or sheaf of accelerated particles or neutral particles. In this instance the speed of motion is the speed of light or is very close to it and the time required for the energy to reach the target is less than a second. This makes these weapons the only applicable ones for targets of the SDI for effecting the targets in the propulsion stage. For this reason, we will examine only the problems which arise in employing this type of weapon.

There are two serious limitations which influence space weapons: the brief time during which they must operate and the problem of energy. The latter problem to a certain degree can be resolved if a portion of the weapons is

located on the earth. One proposal of this type is to use a system of powerful ground-based lasers and a guidance system located in space. This consists of at least two mirrors with a diameter over 5 m. One can be located in a geostationary orbit some 36,000 km above the earth as this gives it the possibility of remaining constantly over the selected point in a zone close to the equator. The other mirror is in a low orbit of from 200 to 400 km. This is the so-called "combat" reflector and focuses the laser beam on the ICM in shifting constantly in following the motion of the missile.

This tracking continues until the necessary dose of thermal energy is delivered, around 5 seconds. Then, if the combat mirror is reaimed sufficiently quickly and the entire system responds instantaneously, a single combat mirror in 100 seconds (which is approximately the length of the propulsion stage) can destroy approximately 20 ICM. This means that 70 aiming mirrors and the same number of combat mirrors would be required for the 1,400 ICM.




Diagram of positioning of elements of system of combat mirrors, kinetic and direct weapons according to stages of flight of ICM

Key: 1--Cloud of over 100 objects

But the combat mirrors are in a low orbit, they pass quickly over the target and this reduces their "range zone." For this reason for the same orbit there must be several mirrors which can "pass on" the successively presented targets. If we assume that a combat mirror has such qualities that it keeps the necessary density of laser beam energy at a distance of 3,000 km, then it turns out that each orbit must have an average of 6 combat mirrors. This means that a system of combat mirrors must consist of over 400 mirrors. On the other hand, the territories which are sufficiently distant from the equator remain over the horizon of the geostationary satellites. This increases the distance between the directing and combat mirrors while the very great path traveled by the laser beam through the denser layers of the atmosphere leads to a significant increase in the required energy of the laser beam. For this reason it is essential to have another type of orbit which increases the number of directing mirrors by around 3-fold, that is, more than

200 of them would be needed. Thus, the entire system consists of ground-based powerful lasers and approximately 600 mirrors aimed and controlled by powerful computers.

What Energy Is Required?

What energy is required for this system? It is equal to that obtained from 300 electric plants of 1,000 megawatts each. But this energy is required in a very short period of time, some 100 seconds, and cannot be taken from the capacity presently existing in the United States. A specially built power system for the designated type of laser weapon would cost from 60 to 100 billion dollars and would have to be in constant combat readiness, that is, could not be employed for other purposes. For developing and building the lasers, for developing and orbiting a system of mirrors obviously a much larger amount will be required and at present no one can estimate this amount. (The most optimistic circles assume that 300 billion dollars would be required for realizing the SDI. Others assume that 1,000 billion would have to be spent and the expected result would not be achieved. There are circles who feel that 30-60 billion would be required for research alone and after this the United States, now being ready, could talk to the USSR from a position of strength.) A different version is unrealistic, that is, locating the lasers in space. Then the number of mirrors would be reduced but for each laser the power system would weigh several tons and estimates indicate that for putting this weight into space some 1,000 launches would be required. This means, for example, that 100 years would be required with 10 launches a year (the present intensity of flights by ships of the Space Shuttle type).

Another solution to the energy problem is the employing of X-ray lasers. At least in principle, it would be possible to manufacture comparatively light X-ray lasers which would be positioned in space or would be launched when necessary. The laser would be "primed" by a nuclear explosive device. It would emit thermal X-rays which stimulate X-ray radiation from a system of delicate fibers located near the explosive device. The X-ray radiation cannot be directed and an X-ray laser does not have such focusing as do lasers in the optical, ultraviolet or infrared range. For example, the beam of an X-ray laser at a distance of 4,000 km will produce a spot with a radius of around 100 m, that is, the energy density will be small. This means that a satellite carrying an X-ray laser must be very close to the targets and consequently the number of these satellites must be greater than the number of combat mirrors. In bearing in mind that each such satellite is "single-use," because the nuclear explosion destroys it, their number must be increased even further. It must be pointed out that while other lasers such as excimer, dynamic gas lasers or free electron lasers, are already in the initial stage of use, the X-ray ones are still in the stage of preliminary studies.

Difficulties and Risks

There are major technological difficulties in carrying out the SDI and these depend upon the type of space weapon. For example, with a system of combat mirrors, one basic question is the focusing of the beam. This is proportional to the diameter of the mirror and depends upon the quality of the mirror. In order for it to be good, the roughness of the surface must be less than 0.01

micron for the ultraviolet range. Variations have been discussed for orbiting a mirror with a diameter of 30 m while, for the sake of comparison, let us point out that the largest mirror on earth today has a diameter of 6 m. If such a mirror is used, then at a distance of 1,000 km, the cross-section of the laser beam will double and this, in turn, reduces the energy reaching the target.

We will not discuss the enormous difficulties involved in orbiting or assembling such a mirror in space and in space such a mirror will be as fragile as it is on earth. But the intense ultraviolet light, the natural flows of charged particles and weightlessness will influence the qualities of the mirror. With a definite positive probability, meteorite flows will destroy them and certainly they will have to be regularly replaced and repaired.

A laser weapon depends greatly upon the clarity of the optical track. The presence of clouds of dust or artificially created optical curtains greatly reduces its effectiveness and specialists have called it a "good-time weapon."

[10 May 1986, p 4]

[Text] In addition to the technological difficulties of realizing the SDI which we have examined, there are also two major problems.

Two Major Problems

The first is that such a system can be controlled only by supercomputers. In a period of less than 1 second, the following must be carried out: the target must be picked up, the trajectory calculated, the type of missile determined, the information for the command post transmitted, the decision for destruction taken, the mirrors aimed and the hit ascertained. All of this must be done in less than a second. With the next target, things become even more complicated as the command computer must reassign the targets in such a manner that it does not turn out that several mirrors are aimed at one target and none at another. All of this must be checked several times in order to achieve the required reliability.

Over the next 20 years, will such flawless supercomputers be developed? Specialists are dubious and an experiment in space research has shown that the computers cannot always respond with the necessary reliability. A preliminary testing of the readiness and reliability of such a complex system is virtually impossible. The system can be tested against one or two missiles but obviously it cannot be tested against a thousand. But this means that the reliability and even the response of the system as a whole will be a guess even for its developers. It can be assumed that they will "endow" it with the capacity for self-defense. This means that even if a certain number of mirrors fail due to one or another reason, the supercomputer will respond as if the system was under attack. This provides grounds to assume that the probability is not slight that the system itself, without an external cause, will begin its attack.

The transfer of such great responsibility to the machines entails both serious military-political as well as a number of social risks. The system of human values and the conduct of the ordinary man will be exclusively influenced by the thought that his life, the life of his children and dear ones depend upon the computer which can always err or be damaged.

The second major problem is the assumption that the USSR has no way of taking any measures. We will not examine the natural opportunity of the USSR to increase its number of ICBM. Obviously with a certain, possibly even slight increase in the missiles and silos, including dummy ones, the entire Star Wars system will become very ineffective and consequently senseless. But the system can become useless even without an increased number of missiles. For example, if missiles are developed which have a shorter propulsion period, for example, 60 seconds, then the entire system becomes ineffective. The development of such missiles with the present state of space development is possible.

The main effect of the laser beam is the thermal hit on the missile surface. But it is also possible to develop surfaces which reflect light in one or another range or surfaces which can quickly evaporate and create a cloud around the missile which reduces the access of energy from the beam to the missile. In scientific literature there are other variations for a multiple reduction of the combat capability of space weapons. The realization of these or some of these capabilities is easier and, correspondingly, less expensive than the SDI.

Finally, it must be pointed out that the SDI does not provide any guarantees. The reason is that the SDI is a system aimed solely at the ICBM and has virtually minimal effectiveness against cruise missiles which will be launched from submarines and aircraft. Thus, an enormous amount will be invested without achieving even half the promised 100-percent protection.

But Is the SDI a Defensive System?

One of the main arguments by the supporters of the SDI is that this system is solely defensive. However, it is easy to realize that the weapons of this system can be aimed at an arbitrary satellite, that is, they in essence will be a part of an antisatellite system. But the development of such a system has already been banned by the existing treaties. It seems to us that offensive weapons are essentially being developed as defensive ones. A satellite is much more accessible as a target than is an ICBM and hence the effectiveness of this system against such targets will be great. If an ideal defense is not created, the United States will still create a powerful offensive antisatellite system. The laser beams destined for the ICBM can be aimed at civilian objects. And if the power of such weapons is not sufficient to destroy the missiles it is more than sufficient to cause enormous fires and catastrophes.

Certainly there have been declarations and gentleman's promises that such developed weapons will not be employed as offensive ones. But can we trust a complicated and not particularly reliable system of computers? They can be reprogrammed. And there are sufficient political and military circles who are

ready to do anything. As proof, we might mention the fact that in the United States they are seriously considering a project for developing a system for protecting the launch silos by a series of nuclear explosions activated precisely before the arrival of the incoming ICBM. The dust and fragments hurled high from the powerful explosions will destroy the warheads by a direct hit or igniting. This project which assumes nuclear explosions on one's own territory indicates that there are people who in their ambitions will stop at nothing. And most probably they will be the ones who control the Star Wars system.

There Is Only One Way

From the scientific and technical viewpoint, there is no doubt that the Star Wars program is a qualitatively new step in the arms race which confronts mankind with a catastrophe. The very fact that the decision to commence combat operations in space will require great confidence in computers, even with all sorts of protective measures, places mankind in danger. In considering all the possible technical malfunctions and unforeseen events, such a situation is the equivalent of suicide. The opinion of the physical scientific community is that there is no scientific and technical solution to the question of the nuclear threat. Any attempt to realize the SDI is a flight from reality. There is only one solution and that is a political one. The program proposed by Mikhail Gorbachev for gradual nuclear disarmament up to the year 2000 is an example of the full awareness of the responsibility imposed by our times. Such an understanding is also found in the CPSU Program which explicitly emphasizes that the CPSU will strive consistently to restrict and narrow the sphere of military preparations, particularly related to weapons of mass destruction. Space must be completely excluded above all from this sphere.

The political will of the USSR to find a nonmilitary solution to the question can also be seen in the risks which it has assumed by a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. Let us mention that this will freeze a series of research which is in full swing in the United States. Only the exceptional significance of the first steps to disarmament can justify these risks and only by strengthening trust and gradual disarmament can mankind escape from the impasse of the nuclear threat. In bearing in mind that the SDI research is gaining momentum, the program for complete disarmament proposed by the USSR must be examined and adopted at present, because tomorrow will be too late.

10272

CSO: 5200/3031

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR: REAGAN GLASSBORO SPEECH, SOVIET INITIATIVES CONTRASTED

PM231922 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 27, 14 Jul 86 pp 6-7

[Vladlen Kuznetsov article: "Beyond the Bounds of Common Sense"]

[Text] The hell-bent train of the arms race is hurtling on. Everywhere the demand is that it stop. Stop signals are given from Geneva, Vienna, Stockholm, and from the United Nations, where efforts are being made to check the material preparation of war. But the train must plunge on and even picks up speed.

It is clear to the entire international community that the brakes must be put on the arms buildup. Yet official Washington, set on going back on the existing strategic arms limitations, is removing what is in effect the last check.

In his covering letter to a secret report sent to Congress on the observance by the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. of the SALT-I and SALT-II treaties, the U.S. President maintains that "The Soviet forces are very large and would appear, in our judgement, more than enough to meet reasonable military requirements."

Could it be that, in a situation when modern civilization could be destroyed not once, but several times over, the White House is prepared to apply the same criterion of adequacy and reasonableness to its own Armed Forces? Unfortunately not. The criterion there is different: Unlimited super-armament. Unlike Moscow, Washington does not want to stop the arms conveyer. What it wants is to continue "playing catch-up," as the President puts it, under cover of the utterly false contention that the U.S. is lagging behind the U.S.S.R.

"Catch-up games" could prove costly for both countries, indeed, for all countries and peoples, in both the direct and the figurative sense of the word. No one can get away from the fact that the choice is between going over to actual disarmament or a runaway arms race fraught with the danger of an explosion of any moment. Far from all have clearly and unequivocally opted for disarmament, which is impeded by the frenzied resistance of the militarist quarters and by fossilized political thinking that for centuries sought security only by military means. To facilitate and hasten the taking of the choice vitally needed by the whole of humanity, the Soviet Union has in the recent period taken a number of measures which have been assessed by broad sections of world opinion as decisive and far-reaching.

The Soviet programme of disarmament extends to all categories of armaments and is projected at closing all channels for their buildup. That programme has been worked out in detail and is substantive and practicable. Moreover, it envisages reliable verification at all stages of disarmament, with the use of both national means of verification and international procedures all the way to on-the-spot inspection.

The Soviet Union's comprehensive, far-reaching and constructive strategy of disarmament, its readiness to take into account the security interests and positions of other countries, is exerting a strong influence on Western thinking. And not only on spheres considered always amenable to Soviet initiatives. The British Government, Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe said during a foreign policy debate in the House of Commons, believes that the U.S.S.R. sincerely wants the arms buildup ended and disarmament started. Similar statements have been made by many other official spokesmen of NATO countries. Appraising the significance of the Soviet initiatives, the London SUNDAY TIMES observed: "Gorbachev tabled the most forthcoming offer the Kremlin has yet made.... The way could thus be opened for an historic missile-cutting deal." And Willy Brandt, chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), in an interview to the American NBC television network, voiced the conviction that the Western countries should devote more attention to the peace initiatives advanced by the other side than to the testing of new weapons.

The Soviet proposals, which have become the common foreign policy platform of all the countries of the socialist community, opens the way for East and West to a breakthrough in efforts to check the avalanche of armaments and in putting their relations on a more constructive footing. People everywhere are naturally wondering whether Washington will again, as so many times before, miss a favourable opportunity. The anxiety is understandable. For only the blind and the deaf will fail to see and hear that while the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries are ready for the broadest mutual understanding with the West, ready to rise above differences and to put an end to the confrontation, the U.S. ruling circles are out to terminate the process of arms limitation and reduction, have carried out their thirteenth nuclear weapons test since the announcement of the Soviet moratorium, and are staging aggressive actions and provocations against Libya and Nicaragua, in the Middle East, in Angola and in Afghanistan. The contrast is glaring. It cannot but give food for thought even to the ruling elite in the U.S.

This was reflected in the speech the President delivered on June 19 in Glassboro, New Jersey. He used all his eloquence to persuade his hearers of the administration's dedication to peace and disarmament.

Many Western news analysts saw in this "essay on peace," as the President himself described his speech, something new and positive in relation to the Soviet Union, a conciliatory note.

The President conceded that "the Soviets have made suggestions on a range of issues, from nuclear power plant safety to conventional force reductions in Europe." He went even further saying that "the Soviets have begun to make a serious effort." Considering that not long ago the existence of any such serious intentions was denied, it may be said that some corrections have been introduced in prejudiced appraisals. If this is a sign that the American leadership intends to stop rejecting Soviet proposals out of hand as pure propaganda, it can only be welcomed.

The Soviet Union harbours no prejudices or bias towards the U.S. We applaud the pianist Vladimir Horowitz, are grateful to Dr Robert Gale and Armand Hammer for their help at a time of misfortune and to the American firemen who paid tribute to the feat of their Soviet counterparts in Chernobyl. The correct, truly civilized relations the Soviet Union invariably advocates presuppose response to all that is good, to the slightest positive signals and impulses. If the President really thinks that there could now be "a turning point in the effort to make ours a safer and more peaceful world," he may rest assured that this will be given the most serious consideration.

The President said "there can be no more important task before us than that of reducing nuclear weapons, that talk alone is not enough." The time has come to move forward. This is precisely what the Soviet Union constantly underscores.

The proof of good intentions are deeds, and only deeds. It still remains for the U.S. to prove its avowed dedications to peace and disarmament, to prove what the Soviet Union has already proved by unilaterally terminating nuclear explosions, by scaling down and displaying restraint in military activity, and by strictly abiding by the SALT-I and SALT-II treaties. In view of this it is hardly in place for the President to strike the pose of a front-runner in disarmament as he does when he invites the Soviet leadership "to join me in taking action -- action in the name of peace." What the White House only intends to embark on has long been the standard practice in the Kremlin. Calls to the U.S.S.R. to "prove willing" and to "intensify efforts" are misaddressed. It is high time those who issue these calls acted accordingly.

The President told his worldwide audience that his country had "worked to break the patterns of history all too often resulted in war." Such patterns include the drive for military superiority and world hegemony, and the use of armed forces as a means of resolving issues in dispute. But has the U.S. renounced these militarist traditions?

The new political thinking dictated by the realities of the nuclear age is insistently knocking at the door of the White House. But the door remains closed, and if it is opened, only the tiniest crack. Is this not why, as many feel in the U.S., the present incumbent in the five and a half years of his presidency has been unable to reach agreement with the U.S.S.R. in the matter of arms reduction and limitation, is this not why he has failed where several of his predecessors succeeded? It is clear, then, why Reagan made an attempt in Glassboro to persuade the U.S. public, Western Europe and the Soviet Union that he seriously wants to see the arms race checked and that he is capable of reaching agreement with the U.S.S.R. before his term of office is over. At the same time he sought to dispel the opinion widespread in the world that U.S. "arms control" policy has been placed practically in its entirety at the service of the diehard opponents of disarmament, who under all administrations have sought to dismantle and scrap the entire SALT mechanism.

In 1979, when the SALT-II treaty was signed, spokesman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff unanimously conceded at Senate hearings that the agreement accorded with America's security interests. What has changed since then to warrant the ostracism of a document that checks the arms race in one of its most dangerous areas? The United States' European allies are taken aback. All experts are astounded. The whole world is asking how the Reagan administration could ever have decided that the United States should renounce the SALT-II treaty. This question is asked, for instance, by a former congressman, now professor of law at Georgetown University, Robert Drinan.

Evidently it is believed that for America, rearmed and overarmed under the present administration, agreements with the U.S.S.R. become something of a Procrustean bed. After the SALT-II treaty the next in line to be jettisoned is the ABM Treaty. When that is done, no one will be able to prevent the U.S. from doing what it pleases, from bringing SDI to fruition. All limitations would be gone.

There are in the United States no few sober minds who have seen through the stratagem of replacing an obsolete, ineffective and even "flawed" treaty with some miracle

contract. "Ronald Reagan is not prepared to bargain seriously on arms control," former Deputy Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Spurgeon Keeny says. "He has established that he is more interested in challenging the Soviet Union to an open-ended nuclear arms race than in constraining Soviet strategic forces by an agreement."

It is legitimate to ask: What is this position based on? If we decipher opinions full of hidden meaning voiced by high-ranking administration spokesmen, it will be seen that it rests on the following three assumptions:

The U.S. is capable of winning the arms race, while the U.S.S.R. will not be able to bear the burden.

By its SDI programme the U.S. has created for the U.S.S.R. difficult problems which it will not be able to resolve.

The U.S., by its policy of neoglobalism and support of anti-communist forces the world over, will roll back both communism and the national liberation movement of the peoples.

Such are the assumptions. But they are based on faulty reasoning. Washington cannot but be aware that the U.S.S.R. has the potential to neutralize the threat created by the rearmament of America. It also ought to reckon with the potential of the peoples who have embarked on the highroad of independent development and are supported by progressives the world over. It should not preen itself over Grenada. After all, before Grenada there were Korea and Vietnam. Cuba, Angola, Nicaragua and Libya are reminders that the world policeman is not omnipotent.

Thus on closer examination all the above assumptions turn out to be illusions. But they are no less dangerous for that. What could it all spell for the United States itself? David Newsom, director of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University, says: "If the policies fail, the results will not be a Soviet collapse, but serious long-term political, budgetary and security problems for the United States and for its allies." To this conclusion one can only add: It is a good thing that there are Americans aware of the danger of a shortsighted policy that is prompted not by the realities of life but by fictions and anti-communist dogmas, and hence is altogether beyond the bounds of common sense.

The Glassboro speech did not particularly perplex experienced American news commentators. Flora Lewis, writing in THE NEW YORK TIMES, draws attention to the ambiguity and contradictoriness of the American position, and asks whether the muddle is not deliberate and intended to "confuse the Russians"? The conclusion she draws is this: There is no evidence whatsoever of any intention to come out with coherent, consistent statements on American policy from which friends and enemies could learn what precisely to expect of the United States.

Incidentally, while the President was waving the olive branch in Glassboro, others brandished the nuclear fist and thereby threw light on what can be expected from official Washington. Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger called for extending the geographic zone of NATO and placing its armed forces at the service of U.S. global expansion. In another public statement the Pentagon chief expatiated on how "star wars" could make it possible to destroy missiles "as they emerge from their silos." From talk of this order it is only a step to insane first-strike notions.

The Soviet Union, let me repeat, is not set on confrontation with the U.S.; it does not take a prejudiced view of everything done and said there. A conciliatory tone is of course preferable to brazenness. But such a tone is not a constant attribute of Washington policy. Each time the makers of this policy allow themselves to be "carried away" and waves of indignation arise on both sides of the Atlantic, the hawks begin to coo. But not for long. They soon return to their screeching.

Apart from a few words in an occasional speech, so far there is no indication of Washington displaying restraint, an honest desire to find a common language with others on the vital issues of war and peace. Verbal assurances of a striving for conciliation are not enough. It must find reflection in behaviour, actions, realistic policy. The Soviet Union awaits tangible positive changes in U.S. policy, a truly constructive approach to initiatives and proposals that pave the way to a secure peace.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

VIKTOR KARPOV INTERVIEWED ON ARMS NEGOTIATIONS

PM211235 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 28, 21 Jul 86 pp 4-5

[Interview with Viktor Karpov, head of the Soviet delegation at the Soviet-American talks in Geneva on nuclear and space armaments, by R. Krestyaninov: "The Outlook in Geneva" -- date not given]

[Text] [Krestyaninov] Now that the latest round of the talks is over, how would you comment on its result?

[Karpov] It will be remembered that the main purpose of the talks, as was confirmed at the last summit meeting, is to prevent an arms race in outer space and to terminate it on earth, to ensure the limitation and reduction of nuclear armaments, and to strengthen military-strategic stability.

It is to these ends that the Soviet side has concentrated its efforts. It has done everything in its power to impart to the talks the added impetus which was agreed upon during Mikhail Gorbachev's meeting with President Ronald Reagan.

As regards the U.S. position, the American delegation again failed to advance any new ideas at the round just over. More, one could discern in its very approach to the talks the intention to mark time. This was evident also in the character of the discussions that took place, in the reaction of the U.S. to our proposals, and in many other things that go to make up the atmosphere of the talks.

As a result, this round too ended without any practical agreements being reached. True, the American side voiced readiness, as the U.S. President himself has done, to study the Soviet proposals and to reply to them. The question which remains open is what that reply will be. One would like to hope that it will be positive and that the next round will produce concrete results. It is now up to the American side to say the decisive word.

[Krestyaninov] What concretely are the Soviet Union's latest proposals in the sphere of space and strategic armaments? Some in the West maintain that they are proclaimed from the rostrum but not laid on the negotiating table.

[Karpov] The most radical solution of space problems would unquestionably be prohibition of space strike weapons, as the Soviet Union has urged from the very beginning of the talks. The obstacle, however, is the position of the United States, which places the emphasis on the realization of the Strategic Defence Initiative

programme. Faced with undisguised unwillingness to prevent once and for all the spread of weaponry to outer space, we proposed a search for partial solutions which could help to prevent an arms race in outer space.

What specifically do we have in mind? First, prohibition of anti-satellite systems; second, a ban on space armaments of the space-to-earth class, and, lastly, strengthening of the regime called for by the treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems.

We proposed that the Soviet Union and the United States undertake the commitment not to exercise their right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for at least 15 years and strictly to abide by all of its provisions. To remove all misunderstandings, the Americans were urged to agree on a clear-cut distinction between permissible laboratory research on ABM systems or their components, and projects prohibited by the treaty.

As regards strategic offensive weapons, two major Soviet proposals have been submitted for consideration in Geneva. The first provides for a 50 per cent cut in Soviet and American nuclear weapons capable of reaching the territory of the other side--inter-continental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, heavy bombers and corresponding medium-range weapons (missiles and aircraft). Each side would be entitled to have on the remaining delivery vehicles no more than 6,000 nuclear warheads. Long-range cruise missiles of all basing modes would be prohibited.

The U.S. proved to be unprepared for such a radical solution. Whereupon we proposed a compromise: the reduction by both sides of their strategic systems (ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers and their weaponry) to 1,600 units on each side. A separate decision would be taken on medium-range weapons capable of reaching each other's territory, including long-range land-based cruise missiles. The deployment would be permitted within certain limits of long-range cruise missiles carried by bombers and strictly defined types and a limited number of submarines. Deployment of this type of cruise missiles on surface ships would be prohibited. After the reductions the total number of nuclear warheads would be limited to a maximum of 8,000 units on each side.

Our new proposal took into account the United States' two basic objections to the 50 percent reduction, namely, its objections to the reduction of medium-range weapons capable of reaching each other's territory and to the total ban on long-range cruise missiles. Thus, we took into account the unwillingness of the U.S. to agree to far-reaching cuts. For the American proposals which are likewise supposed to envisage 50 percent reductions actually would set the ceiling not at 6,000 but 15,000 or more nuclear warheads.

We of course prefer the more radical solution -- reduction of the corresponding nuclear armaments of the Soviet Union and the United States by half, with a total ban on space strike weapons. As regards an interim arrangement it could be realized without delay, inside five-six years, if agreement were reached on the observance of the ABM Treaty for at least another 15 years.

At the very beginning of the fifth round, the Soviet Union submitted a draft agreement on the elimination of American and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe. The formulations of the draft which had been worked out in detail could serve as the basis for a joint draft of such an agreement. However, our proposal was in effect drowned in far-fetched procedural discussions deliberately started by the American side.

Now about the allegations advanced in the West that the Soviet side proclaims far-reaching proposals from the high rostrum which then are not laid on the negotiating table. As a participant in the Geneva talks and as one familiar with the state of affairs also at other negotiations on disarmament and confidence-building measures, I can definitely say that this is a malicious Western propaganda invention.

The proposals the Soviet delegation has put forward at the talks fully accord with what the Soviet leadership has been saying. This applies also to proposals relating to nuclear and space weapons.

[Krestyaninov] Some in the West are trying to make it appear as if the Soviet Union's new proposal on medium-range missiles were identical with the "zero option" Reagan put forward some time ago.

[Karpov] The point is not whether it corresponds to the option Reagan offered or not. The crucial thing is which proposal would reduce the Soviet-American nuclear missile confrontation in Europe to zero, and which would not.

The U.S. "zero option" was put forward as a means of achieving the one-sided disarmament of the U.S.S.R. in the sphere of medium-range missiles both in Europe and in Asia. We, on the contrary, offer a fair and effective way of doing away with all missiles, both Soviet and American in Europe, where the concentration of this type of weapon presents the greatest danger. We are ready to destroy the SS-20 missiles if the U.S. does likewise with its own medium-range missiles in Europe. Moreover, we do not insist on the elimination of the corresponding French and British nuclear weapons. We are ready to give effect to our proposal, provided these nuclear forces remain numerically unchanged and the U.S. does not transfer its strategic and medium-range missiles to other countries. We are of course exposing our security to a certain risk, but we realize that someone must take the first step towards ridding Europe of nuclear weapons, both medium-range and tactical.

[Krestyaninov] Can it be said that the proposals put forward by the Warsaw Treaty countries in Budapest have had an influence on the course of the talks in Geneva?

[Karpov] It definitely can. The point is that -- evidently not without prompting from the U.S. -- objectives have been raised in some European countries, primarily in the F.R.G., to our proposal on medium-range missiles. These objections boil down to the contention that if the U.S. missiles were removed from Europe the NATO countries would be at a disadvantage inasmuch as the U.S.S.R. has operational-tactical and tactical nuclear weapons which supposedly would give it the advantage. Besides, the proponents of this view in the West argue that the U.S.S.R. and the other Warsaw Treaty countries possess more powerful armed forces than NATO and this, they say, would be damaging to Western security if the U.S. missiles were removed. Both of these objections are figments of imagination and do not accord with the actual balance of strength -- the rough parity between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries.

The Budapest programme for the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments from the Atlantic to the Urals and the Soviet Union's readiness to reduce its operational-tactical nuclear strength simultaneously with its realization knocked the ground from under the feet of those who trotted out the "Soviet threat" bogey in this connection. These proposals unquestionably opened new favourable opportunities also for the Geneva talks. Whether our American negotiating partners will make use of these opportunities for the achievement of agreement, primarily on medium-range missiles in Europe, is another matter.

[Krestyaninov] Many prominent Western politicians have made statements contending that there are signs of a breakthrough at the talks and even that by the end of the year a relevant agreement could be concluded. How justified is this optimism?

[Karpov] I would say that the position of the Soviet Union at the talks offers tangible openings for agreement on the entire range of problems relating to space and nuclear weapons already this year. The only obstacle is the position of our negotiating partners.

We are engaged in a constructive search for mutually acceptable practical solutions and do not seek unilateral benefits, military advantages for ourselves. We are ready for both the most radical solutions and interim decisions. Besides, we present no ultimatums. On the contrary, we take the position of the other side into account.

However, I am not prone to euphoria. What is needed is a sober appraisal of the state of affairs at the talks and of the actions undertaken by the U.S. outside their framework. The fact is that Washington has officially announced that it will not continue to observe the SALT-I and SALT-II treaties.

If the U.S. goes on deploying more and more strategic armaments -- and this is envisaged in its programmes -- this trend of developments can in no way make for the success of the talks.

It is a well-known fact that the American SDI programme essentially runs counter to the ABM Treaty, and it is not by chance that U.S. Defence Secretary Weinberger, for instance, has repeatedly said that at some stage in the realization of that programme the U.S. will have to either revise the treaty or simply withdraw from it.

The U.S. side has repeatedly voiced its readiness to hold a Soviet-American meeting at summit level. But if the U.S. really wants such a meeting, it should confirm by its actions its avowed readiness to work for concrete practical solutions in the matter of disarmament.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

MOSCOW ON WHITE HOUSE DELAY IN ANSWERING GORBACHEV

LD171800 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1445 GMT 17 Jul 86

[From "The World Today" program presented by Valentin Zorin]

[Excerpts] At a briefing for journalists which is held every day in the White House, an official spokesman of the President was asked a question as to which stage had been reached in preparing the President's reply to the letter sent to him by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev that set out the latest Soviet proposals on medium-range missiles and strategic nuclear arms limitation. Although some time has passed since the Soviet leader's letter was received in Washington, the White House's official spokesman was unable to give journalists a constructive answer to that question. He said that the President's reply is still at the discussion stage: This reply will not be given straightaway; we need a lot of time to prepare it.

Unfortunately, such a position of the leaders of the Washington administration has become the norm. Up to now it has been unable to give a constructive answer to the Soviet Union's proposal on the program for the liquidation of nuclear weapons covering a period of 15 years. This proposal was put forward on 15 January of this year. But in Washington even now they are still getting by with unconstructive obscure formulas.

The same thing applies to the new, far-reaching Soviet proposals for the liquidation of chemical weapons, including measures to monitor the liquidation of enterprises that manufacture them, the immense program for the reduction of conventional armaments and the new integrated proposals recently tabled at the Geneva talks. [passage omitted]

The impression is conveyed that in the United States capital they are completely perplexed over the series of Soviet proposals that make up an all-embracing plan for an end to the arms race and the implementation of a program of far-reaching measures on disarmament. This perplexity is also reflected in the attempts to avoid replies to set questions and in the contradictory statements by the leaders of the Washington administration which come out from time to time on the banks of the Potomac.

In connection with this, international observers are drawing the conclusion that Washington has not only utterly lost the diplomatic initiative, but has also acutely weakened its political standing in the eyes of world public opinion and in its relations with its closest allies."

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SALT/START ISSUES

USSR: U.S. DEVELOPMENT OF 'INSERTABLE' WARHEADS CONDEMNED

PM171517 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Jul 86 Second Edition p 3

[Colonel I. Nikolayev article under the rubric "United States -- the Bulwark of Militarism": "Why Does the Dragon Need False Teeth?"]

[Text] There is a flurry of activity in the U.S. militarists' camp. Hawks of every stripe, sensing which way the wind is blowing, have jointly embarked on the elaboration of "ideas" aimed at wiping out what is left of detente. One group is advocating "burying" the SALT II treaty, proposing that every possible quantitative limit imposed by this document on strategic offensive arms should be violated at the earliest opportunity. Others are actively undermining the Soviet-American Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of unlimited duration which serves as the basis for strategic offensive arms accords. A third group goes even further, proposing that the whole system of treaties which determine Soviet-American relations in such a sensitive sphere as national security should be abandoned.

In this motley assemblage of "saboteurs of detente" an independent clan has formed of people who are advocating what appears to be a purely technical idea -- the creation of so-called "insertable charges" [vstavnyye zaryady]. And they do not confine themselves to verbal exhortations. The administration is already looking into the question of the development of arms which could swiftly be converted from conventional into nuclear arms by means of "detachable," "insertable" warheads. In the opinion of the Livermore National Laboratory designers, any weapon system can be adapted to take "insertable" nuclear components. According to P. (Braun), the laboratory's chief expert (on arms control questions!) such components will find wide application in tactical weapons -- sea-launched torpedoes or ground forces' short-range missiles, for instance. And as if to corroborate this, reports have appeared in the press, the INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, for instance, to the effect that U.S. ground forces are already conducting experiments with a "detachable" warhead for the Lance missile; the U.S. Navy is reportedly also studying the possibility of the utilization of "similar technology for the most varied purposes."

And (J.) Miller, who heads arms development [sozdaniye] work at the laboratory goes even further; he has declared that systems suitable for conversion into nuclear systems "would make sense in very many cases" where the U.S. Armed Forces are concerned. And he cites as an example the "Midgetman" strategic ICBM which is currently being built. The idea of "insertable" warheads also has the backing of the well-known hawk R. Perle, assistant secretary of defense for policy, who has discovered great "virtues" in this kind of weapon.

It would be naive to believe that all these zealous advocates of "hybrid weapons" are unaware of the danger with which these weapons are fraught. They are well aware of it. And what is more, they not only understand it but are rejoicing at the difficulties which they will produce for arms control. The selfsame (Braun) declared cynically: "Disarmament advocates will tear their hair out, I imagine."

Meanwhile, Perle argues that if the components are used on combat means "which are not sufficiently big to be taken into account in arms limitation agreements," no damage will be done, as he puts it. In other words, the nuclear dragon with false teeth has quite a few advocates.

Sober-minded politicians in the United States itself are perfectly aware of the terrible danger which would be created by such "insertable" warheads. (U. Arkin), a nuclear arms expert at the Institute for Policy Studies, described their explosive role accurately. "Let us assume that the other side detects incoming Pershings on its radar screen.

How is it to tell that they are only equipped with nonnuclear warheads?" he writes with inexorable logic. "This can lead to the immediate escalation of the conflict since the other side does not know with what warheads--nuclear or nonnuclear--the missiles are equipped." And P. Warnke, former director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, rightly leveled the following accusation at the U.S. Administration: "You, he said, "are trying to create yet another of those nonnuclear means which at best lead to the gradual lowering of the nuclear threshold." One can only agree with another of his statements to the effect that the administration should eliminate existing weapons rather than create new ones.

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SALT/START ISSUES

USSR'S ARBATOV: SALT PROBLEMS COULD BE SOLVED QUICKLY

PM211223 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 29, 21 Jul 86 pp 8-9

[Aleksey Arbatov article: "SALT-2: A Rubicon in American Policy"]

[Text] The intention of the United States no longer to abide by the SALT-II interim agreement, announced by President Reagan on May 27 this year, would signify, should it be carried out next autumn, a serious negative turn in Soviet-American relations and in world politics which is already beset by more than its fair share of complications.

The wrecking of these arguments could generate a chain reaction leading to the collapse of the existing international system of arms limitation and block the road to new accords in the field of disarmament. The world is threatened with the danger of an uncontrolled arms race and of sliding into the thermonuclear abyss. What are the motives and aims such an irresponsible challenge to the spirit of the Geneva summit, the genuine interests of both the Soviet and American peoples and the hopes of mankind that war can be averted?

The present administration has always wanted to have a free hand in carrying out a vast armaments programme designed to secure military superiority over the USSR, and this intent was glaringly obvious in the President's May 27 statement despite all the demagogical phraseology it contained about the striving of the United States for peace and disarmament. The limitations imposed by SALT-II create substantial obstacles to the further buildup of American strategic arsenals.

Indeed, as it puts into service new submarines of the Ohio class armed with Trident-1 and subsequently Trident-2 SLBM's (over and above the first six submarines), the United States is obliged, as from 1985, to dismantle nuclear submarines with Poseidon SLBM's in the ratio of three old for two new ones. This is necessary for it to remain within the SALT-II limits of 1,200 units for submarine-launched ballistic missiles and land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles with MIRVed warheads. (MIRV stands for multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles.) In order to stay within the established limit of 1,320 units for multiple-warheads delivery vehicles (missile launchers and heavy bombers) the United States, as from 1986, must dismantle MIRVed missiles for each B-52 and B-1B heavy bomber fitted out with cruise missiles (over and above 130 planes).

(Footnote) (These demands are explained by simple arithmetic. The U.S. had 496 Poseidon SLBM's on 31 submarines and 550 MIRVed Minuteman-2 ICBM's, totalling 1,046 units. By 1985 it had built another 6 nuclear submarines of the Ohio class with 24 Trident-1 SLBM's each. This brought the total to 1,190 units. The 7th and 8th Ohio submarines would exceed the ceiling of 1,200 units by 38.

If three Poseidon submarines with 16 missiles each are phased out in compensation the total number of MIRVed missiles will remain at 1,190 units. This makes it possible to deploy in addition not more than 130 heavy bombers with cruise missiles so as not to exceed the limit of 1,320 units imposed by SALT-II on multiple-warhead delivery vehicles.)

It would be wrong, however, to give only military explanations of the President's decision. Contrary to complaints by American opponents of the agreements, the compensatory phasing out of old armaments in the event of the deployment of new ones within the SALT-I and SALT-II limits is far from being a painful process. More than that, it sometimes saves money. For example, it is cheaper to scrap service-worn submarines than to overhaul them. It was for this reason that the United States dismantled a Poseidon submarine last year and another two this year (after two Ohio missile-firing submarines went to sea). In the entire period of the existence of the SALT agreements, Washington has withdrawn from its strategic forces 168 delivery vehicles and the Soviet Union 540.

A series of 31 Poseidon submarines was built at an accelerated pace in 1962-67. Since such submarines are expected to serve for 25-30 years, they are to be phased out late in the 1980's or in the first half of the 1990's, thus giving the United States a reserve of 496 units of multiple-warhead delivery vehicles. The SALT-II limits only make it necessary to begin phasing out the first batch of old nuclear-powered submarines a few years earlier than planned. An additional reserve for the deployment of MX ICBM's as from 1986 can be ensured in the 1990's by the withdrawal of some of the Minuteman-3 ICBM's in whose launching silos it is intended to install the first series of MX missiles. In the 1990-95 period 250 Minuteman-3 missiles will exceed their term of 20 years of combat service.

As for the development of the second new type of light ICBM -- the Midgetman (the President has appointed a special commission on this matter), even in the event of a positive recommendation by the commission the problem of compliance with SALT-II (which permits only one new type of light ICBM) may arise nearer to the mid-1990's when the time to test the system comes. It is not by chance that even the U.S. top brass -- the Joint Chiefs of Staff -- who should, it would seem, be averse to the idea of scrapping armaments, were until recently in favour of observing SALT-II. And this stand was explained by rudimentary common sense. (It was only at the last moment that the generals succumbed to their superiors.)

The point is that a number of limitations for which the United States pressed most insistently at the talks in the 1970's in the hope of tying the Soviet Union's hands have on the whole been included in the SALT-II treaty. I refer first of all to the ceilings on the total number of strategic delivery vehicles, the number of MIRVed ICBM's and SLBM's, the number of land-based multiple-warhead ICBM's, the ban on the building of additional fixed ICBM launchers into silos for heavy ICBM's (this actually amounting to the perpetuation of the number of Soviet heavy SS-18 missiles). Also in this category is the ban on new types of heavy ICBM's, the limit on the number of permitted new types of light ICBM's (not more than one), on the number of multiple warheads on the existing ICBM's and on a new type of missiles of this class.

As for the limitations on which the Soviet Union insisted, they were included mostly in the protocol to the SALT-II treaty (the ban on the deployment of sea- and land-based cruise missiles with a range exceeding 60 kilometres and also of mobile ICBM launchers). Under the pretext that the protocol had expired in 1981, the United States started in 1983 to deploy cruise missile systems banned by it.

This means that if SALT-II is wrecked, most of the bans lifted are those on which Washington had stubbornly insisted at the time.

These are limitations which affected Soviet strategic programmes to a much greater extent than American ones. What in the past was seen by the United States as a considerable gain for itself is now presented as major military-strategic handicap to Washington's position in respect to SALT-II.

No wonder that even many American supporters of new arms programmes think the abandoning of SALT-II would land Washington with much more problems than gains even from the standpoint of securing unilateral military advantages. This prompts the conclusion that the President's decision was clearly dictated much more by political considerations than by military-strategic ones. Besides, the specific points of the President's statement give the impression of continued infighting within the administration. There appears to be a rather temporary compromise between various groupings in American ruling circles.

There are a number of reasons for the present flareup in Washington's corridors of power of this tussle over questions relating to the Soviet-American dialogue on arms reduction and limitation. After the Geneva summit we witnessed across the ocean an obvious increase of interest in Soviet-American talks, and points of contact appeared with regard to some of the problems. Opposition to the growth of military spending increased and criticism of the SDI programme by specialists as well as laymen intensified.

The prolongation by the Soviet Union of its moratorium on nuclear explosions, the new proposals put forward by socialist countries to reduce conventional armaments in Europe, Moscow's new approaches to solving problems at the Geneva talks have exerted a tremendous positive influence on the political climate throughout the world. But the very same initiatives have caused alarm and resistance from extreme right-wing forces within the administration. They have chosen the expediency of U.S. compliance with SALT-II as the most vulnerable target and camouflaged their aim behind a hyped-up campaign about mythical "Soviet violations" of this treaty.

These forces see their aim in blocking progress at the talks and in torpedoing the existing agreements so as to free themselves of the political constraints that prevent a further spiralling of the arms race. They are prepared to accept even temporary strategic losses for the sake of this long-term objective. Most importantly, the hawks in the U.S. ruling circles see violation of the unratified SALT-II treaty as a stepping stone to the subsequent wrecking of the unlimited ABM Treaty which is the cornerstone of the entire system of arms race control and the main obstacle to the "star wars" programme.

The Soviet Union's stand on this question was stated in no uncertain terms at a very high level. We were not intimidated by Washington's threat to ditch SALT-II. The U.S.S.R. has always believed that SALT-II has never been a favour granted to it by the United States. The treaty benefited both sides. And this is our explanation for the commitment not to undermine it undertaken by the United States in 1982 despite all previous attacks by the present leadership against SALT-II and its non-ratification by Congress.

Furthermore, after the United States dealt a blow to SALT-II by starting to deploy land- and sea-based cruise missiles prohibited by the protocol, the policy of observing

the treaty's limitations was one of goodwill and tolerance on the part of the U.S.S.R. and not of the United States. We continued to observe the treaty not because we were more interested in it in terms of military strategy than the United States. We considered it important to preserve everything positive that had been attained through long and difficult talks in the 1970's both to maintain a favourable political atmosphere and as a basis for subsequent agreements on more radical disarmament measures. So it seems the U.S. Government should consider once again the question of observing the treaty.

For the Soviet Union will not be an accomplice to the dismantling of SALT-II part by part, especially those parts which the United States would want to abandon selectively. In this case the U.S.S.R. will consider itself free of all the treaty's limitations that prevent it from adopting measures to strengthen its defences in response to U.S. offensive and space-based anti-missile weapons. Responsibility for the consequences of an unchecked arms race will rest squarely with Washington.

The problem of observance of agreements has now become a major problem in Soviet-American relations, and no less of a problem than that of concluding new accords. If only because the latter can be based only on the foundation of the existing system of arms limitation. If this foundation is destroyed it will be difficult if not futile to count on reaching new agreements.

In any area of law treaties are to be found about which the parties differ. The two powers have accumulated a number of claims and counter-claims concerning the observance of SALT-I, SALT-II and the ABM Treaty. As for SALT-II, this is due most of all to its uncertain juridical status: it has not been ratified by the United States. There is yet another reason -- Washington's violation of provisions of the protocol. At the time of signing the protocol was viewed as an integral element of SALT-II and the issues mentioned in it were to find a permanent solution in SALT-III.

The Soviet Union has a long list of questions it would like to put to the United States. Some of these could well serve as an adequate pretext for withdrawing from the treaty. But being aware of the full importance of the problem and the responsibility of the great powers for the operation of the agreements and the process of arms limitation, we tried to resolve questions that arose by way of contacts, using the mechanism offered by the standing consultative commission in Geneva. On its part, the U.S.S.R. has always given detailed answers to all U.S. charges against it, ranging from the radar in Krasnoyarsk to the ICBM of the RS-12M type (SS-25 according to the Western classification) and the coding of a part of the telemetry during test missile launchings. The Soviet Union, as has been repeatedly stated by its officials, strictly abides by the existing agreements.

If the United States were really concerned about the observance of the agreements, this problem could no doubt be solved relatively quickly on a level that would accord with the importance of the problem. When the roof leaks, the problem should be resolved with prompt repairs and not by blasting the entire building. So if Washington implements its decision next autumn and exceeds the limits imposed by SALT-II, nobody should have any lingering doubts that the claims of mythical "Soviet violations" are merely a clumsy pretext invented by those who want to have a free hand in lifting all restraints on the arms race.

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CSO: 5200/1481

SALT/START ISSUES

USSR: FURTHER REPORTS ON STEALTH FIGHTER CRASH

Secret Highlighted

PM170815 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Jul 86 First Edition p 5

[Own correspondent V. Sukhoy dispatch: "About the Crash of the 'Invisible' Aircraft"]

[Text] New York, 15 Jul -- As reported earlier, an F-19 Stealth-technology-equipped top secret fighter aircraft suffered an accident and crashed during its latest test flight in the vicinity of the Edwards U.S. Air Force base in California. The aircraft flew through the night sky like a fiery comet and crashed in the Sequoia National Park, the pride of California.

Information about the "Stealth" aircraft is extremely scant. It is known that the construction of the "invisible" aircraft was entrusted to the Lockheed company in the mid-seventies. Its estimated cost is put somewhere between \$250 million and \$1 billion. The first experimental prototype was built in 1977. Until recently it was being "taught to fly while hoodwinking radar" at the Nellis U.S. Air Force base in Nevada. It was there that the first accident of the "invisible" fighter aircraft occurred. In all there have been three accidents.

Now, it appears, "Stealth" is also mastering Californian skies. The test flights are carried out only at night, it is then that the "invisible" aircraft, according to the conception of its creators, is capable of working miracles by penetrating the most up-to-date air defenses without being noticed. On this occasion no miracle happened.

Meant For Use In Nuclear Conflict

LD202307 Moscow TASS in English 2110 GMT 20 Jul 86

[Text] New York July 20 TASS -- The super-secret U.S. "F-19" fighter plane that crashed several days ago in California was "the most up-to-date secret weapon of the Pentagon" and was to be used in case of an outbreak of a nuclear conflict, the UPI news agency reports.

The Pentagon is developing modern first-strike weapon systems which are also intended for staging 'special operations' over the territories of other countries. These include the "F-19" fighter plane produced by the "Lockheed" Corporation with the utilization of the "Stealth" technology which makes it invisible for radars. According to UPI, for this reason the CIA can be interested in using the plane for staging various operations abroad.

Apart from it, UPI continues, the "F-19" fighter plane can be transported by the "C-5a 'Galaxy'" transport plane which permits to deliver it quickly and in conditions of secrecy to any U.S. air force base in any part of the world.

Immediately after the air crash that took place in a mountainous area near Bakersfield, California, a (vast) zone around the plane crash was declared to be a closed zone. For about a week it has been surrounded by troops. Even flights of civil aviation planes over it are prohibited. According to arms expert Lightbody [as received], these precautionary measures were taken because Air Force units were removing the wreckage of the plane which could disclose secret information about the materials of which it was made.

According to UPI, it was the fourth air crash of the 'invisible fighter plane'. The previous one took place in 1984 near Las Vegas, Nevada, in the area of the Nellis Base.

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SALT/START ISSUES

TASS ON STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION SPECIAL SESSION

Moscow Press Briefing

LD211510 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1433 GMT 21 Jul 86

[Text] Moscow, 21 Jul (TASS) — An extraordinary session of the Soviet-U.S. Permanent Consultative Commission opens tomorrow, it was announced today at a press conference for Soviet and foreign journalists held in the press center of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs by Gennadiy Gerasimov, chief of the Information Department at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The commission was created for the following reasons: first, to realize the aims and the tenets of the ABM Treaty; second, to ensure the observation of the accord in the sphere of limiting strategic arms; and third, to monitor the agreement on steps to reduce the danger of a nuclear war starting between the USSR and the United States. It is being convened at the USSR's initiative, and the U.S. side agreed to the Soviet proposal to hold such a session. From the Soviet side, serious questions will be posed relating to the political and strategic consequences of this year's 27 May decision of the Reagan administration concerning the departure of the United States from the 1972 Interim Agreement Limiting Offensive Strategic Arms [SALT I], and from the 1979 SALT II agreement.

The Soviet side proceeds from the premise that everything positive achieved in the sphere of nuclear arms control and reduction must be preserved. Continuance by both sides to observe SALT II would facilitate maintenance of the global balance of forces and the strengthening of security. The Soviet Union does not see a grain of rational thought in the concept the U.S. side proposes in reply, G. Gerasimov noted.

Session Opens

LD221529 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1435 GMT 22 Jul 86

["Standing Consultative Commission Session Opens" -- TASS headline]

[Text] Geneva, 22 Jul (TASS) -- An extraordinary session of the Soviet-U.S. Standing Consultative Commission, which was formed to promote the implementation of the aims and provisions of the ABM Treaty and accords in the field of limiting offensive strategic weapons, and also of the agreement on measures to reduce the danger of nuclear war arising between the USSR and United States, opened here today.

The extraordinary session was convened at the suggestion of the Soviet side in connection with the U.S. refusal to continue to observe the 1972 interim (SALT I) agreement and the 1979 treaty on Limiting Offensive Strategic Arms (SALT-II).

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SALT/START ISSUES

PRAVDA INTERVIEWS UK LABOUR PARTY SHADOW DEFENSE MINISTER

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Jun 86 p 5

[Unsigned Article: "There is No Time to Waste"]

[Text] A British political figure condemns the U.S. intention to refuse observance of the SALT-II agreements. "There is no real reason to prevent the conclusion of an agreement on a full and general prohibition on the testing of nuclear weapons", he states.

President Reagan's intention to refuse to observe the provisions of the SALT-II agreement cannot help but cause anger and concern among all those who are interested in curbing the arms race, stated D. Davis, secretary of state for defense in the Labour "shadow cabinet" in an interview, to PRAVDA correspondent in London, A. Maslennikov. It indicates that the occupant of the White House completely capitulated under the pressure of the right wing of his own administration, which always opposed any arms control agreements.

This step, warned Davis, will inevitably have the most negative effect on the international situation and on the whole structure of East-West relations. It will have a particularly fatal effect on the situation in Europe, where many rightfully see in the U. S. President's decision a desire to achieve superiority in the field of nuclear weapons.

We also cannot help but take into account, continued Davis, that Washington's decision, as has repeatedly happened in the past, was made without any consultations with the other NATO members. The situation which arose when Reagan decided on the "Star Wars" program was almost completely repeated when a most important military and political step, changing the entire strategic concept of the Western Alliance, was undertaken by Washington unilaterally, and the allies were informed of it only ex post facto. In a similar situation the decision was made about U. S. production of a new generation of chemical weapons. In all of these cases we observe one in the same thing: A desire by the American administration to use its NATO allies as pawns in its global game, and the NATO bloc itself as a kind of secondary weapon of American foreign policy.

All of this cannot help but cause our most profound concern. In Western Europe demands are increasing for a more independent policy. We believe that the countries of Western Europe could make a contribution to reducing international tension. We have our own views and interests in world politics, distinct from those of the U. S. These interests are incompatible with concepts such as "limited" nuclear wars, so called because they would hopefully be waged only in Europe, but never on the territory of the U. S. itself. The interests of Western Europeans demand a halt to the militaristic rhetoric which we are always hearing from the Reagan Administration.

In short, Western Europe does not share the attitude toward the Soviet Union inherent in the current Washington administration. We have a different history, different traditions and finally different geography. We live on one continent and not thousands of miles away, as is the United States of America.

Unfortunately, continued Davis, in recent years, in connection with the nature of the political parties in power in a number of Western European countries, this difference in approach has not been manifested as clearly as it should have been. Some of these parties, including the British Conservatives, too obediently follow Washington, for their leaders largely share the ideological concepts of the "cold war," inherent in the Reagan Administration.

We believe that this situation cannot continue endlessly. I am personally convinced that if the Western European NATO member countries were not so frightened by Washington, much more progress could now be achieved in implementing the Helsinki process, in the field of working out an agreement on banning chemical weapons and in the sphere of "Euro-strategic" missiles. Opportunities exist for achieving progress in negotiations on reducing armed forces in Europe, where the latest Soviet proposals, in my view, lay a good basis for achieving agreement. However, priority must be given to achieving an agreement on the question of nuclear weapons, the increase in which represents the main threat.

We in the Labour Party, continued Davis, see no real reasons which would interfere today in concluding a treaty on the complete and universal prohibition of nuclear weapons tests. Objections to such an agreement are being raised by the Reagan Administration, which wishes to continue testing for the purpose of creating new models of nuclear weapons, including those associated with the "Star Wars" program. The Thatcher Government is also playing a negative role in this, as it is interested in carrying out tests in connection with the development of warheads for the new "Trident" missile. Numerous arguments advanced today against banning nuclear tests are false.

A paradox of our time, stated Davis at the end of the discussion, is that a situation has arisen in the world in which the threat of a universal nuclear conflagration has never been so real, and at the same time mankind has never before been so close to being able to eliminate it once and for all. The accident at the Chernobyl AES, in connection with which I would like to express our most profound sympathy for the victims and admiration for the heroism of those who are fighting its consequences -- this accident again confirmed that the only defense against nuclear war can be through prevention.

We in the Labour Party are convinced that there is no time to lose. The governments of the West European countries, including Great Britain, must enter the discussion on these issues. It does not promise to be easy. Differences and difficulties are inevitable. But there is no other way.

RELATED ISSUES

TASS CITES FRENCH PAPER: U.S. ALWAYS ANSWERS 'NO'

LD211639 Moscow TASS in English 1617 GMT 21 Jul 86

[Text] Moscow July 21 TASS -- By TASS analyst Leonid Ponomarev:

The French newspaper, LIBERATION, said today that the Soviet Union has multiplied the number of its large-scale disarmament initiatives over the past two months while the United States has invariably answered "no" or advanced totally unacceptable counter-proposals.

The paper's description accurately reflects the positions of the Soviet Union and the United States on questions of curbing the arms race, above all the nuclear arms race, and on disarmament.

Indeed, despite the American nuclear testing at Nevada, the Soviet Union is sticking to its unilateral moratorium on nuclear blasts. It has come out with a concrete plan for abolishing nuclear and other weapons of mass annihilation by the turn of the 20th century and preventing the development of strike space weapons.

The Soviet Union put forward proposals on eliminating chemical weapons, including measures to control the scrapping of enterprises producing such weapons. In a bid to give an impetus to the Soviet-American talks in Geneva, the USSR worked out an interim option in the approach to the reduction of nuclear armaments.

It proposed an agreement on keeping within the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty for at least 15 years and restricting SDI work to the level of laboratory research, that is the threshold the U.S. has actually approached.

The strategic offensive weapons shall be limited at equal levels, while the question of medium-range weapons reaching each other's territory be handled separately.

The programme of large-scale reduction of the armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe -- from the Atlantic to the Urals, advanced by the USSR and its Warsaw Treaty allies is a major contribution to curbing the arms race.

The U.S. Administration's stand on all these questions is negative. Moreover, Washington intends to break the remaining barriers in the way of the arms race -- the SALT-2 and the ABM Treaty.

The American leaders, in their statements, stand for an "agreement" with the Soviet Union. At the same time, they officially declare, like Defence Secretary Caspar

Weinberger recently did, that any agreement should not hinder the U.S. effort to implement the Strategic Defence Initiative. McGeorge Bundy, a former adviser to the U.S. President on national security, observed in THE NEW YORK TIMES that President Reagan made it clear again that he would not agree to any deal that would affect "his dream" -- SDI.

On the question of nuclear testing, the White House does not wish a universal ban on all nuclear blasts, since ever more explosions are required under the SDI programme.

How is it possible to move in these conditions to lower balanced levels of armaments than at present? By renouncing the earlier Soviet-American agreements and rejecting new Soviet arms control proposals, the U.S. Administration is showing the world that it is in no way interested in curbing the arms race and is only looking for ways to perpetuate it.

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CSO: 5200/1487

RELATED ISSUES

SOVIET COLONEL VIEWS U.S. CONVENTIONAL, NUCLEAR DEFENSE BUDGET

PM180950 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Jul 86 Second Edition p 3

[Colonel M. Ponomarev "Military-Political Review": "The United States: Force Instead of Reason"]

[Text] Consideration of the draft U.S. budget for fiscal 1987 is drawing to a close. Let us recall that, in accordance with customary U.S. procedure, this draft is drawn up by the administration and submitted to Congress. Individual sections and articles of the budget are discussed in various committees and subcommittees, and later at sessions of the House of Representatives and the Senate. The corresponding draft law they agree and approve is forwarded to the President for his signature. Finally, after signing by the head of the White House, the budget law is validated.

So, during the last days of June the budget committees of both houses of the U.S. Congress finally agreed on the main articles of the draft federal budget for the next fiscal year. Immediately after that the House of Representatives approved that version. It is now up to the Senate. The U.S. senators' 2-week vacation ends today. Tomorrow they will reassemble in Washington's Capitol and hold a final vote.

In this connection I would like to draw the readers' attention to the military items in the next American budget. First, because this year a very fierce debate raged in both houses of Congress over the appropriations requested by the administration for military purposes, the like of which has not been seen for a long time in the top U.S. legislative organ. Second -- and most important -- the volume and structure of the American military budget reflect Washington's policy, its military doctrine, the very complex processes associated with militarist preparations in the United States, and its actions in the international arena within the framework of the strategy of neoglobalism.

The overtly aggressive thrust of the White House course, which harbors the threat of nuclear catastrophe for all mankind, is giving rise to growing alarm and condemnation in broad U.S. public circles. U.S. congressmen cannot disregard this. Some of them are increasingly condemning official policy. Thus, Senator P. Simon publicly advocates ending nuclear tests and concluding a complete and general treaty [as published] on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. He has also made other sensible judgments on very acute current problems.

Expressing the will of the voters, the most sober-minded congressmen advocate definite restrictions on military spending.

At the same time, a significant section of American legislators zealously champion the interests of the military-industrial complex and the Pentagon. All the more so as thousands of emissaries of the military-industrial complex are permanently in Washington, ensnaring Congress in a strong lobbying web with a view to achieving a steady increase in appropriations for military purposes that make fabulous profits for the "death concerns."

It was between these two main groups of legislators that unprecedentedly acute battles developed over budget problems. In the final analysis, the advocates of unlimited growth in military spending had to back down somewhat. Although they campaigned for the total satisfaction of the administration's request for the Pentagon to be allocated \$320.8 billion, a compromise version was adopted, equal to \$292.2 billion -- over \$28 billion less than originally planned. By all accounts, this sum will figure in the final draft law on the federal budget for fiscal 1987.

This reduction is noteworthy. We must not, however, be seduced by it. The amount of military spending preserved by Congress stands at almost \$300 billion. Taking into account appropriations for militarist purposes under other budget items, the spending will be still higher. It is known, for example, that funds for the production of nuclear weapons are allocated not to the Pentagon but to the U.S. Department of Energy. These funds run to many billions of dollars. In addition, the compromise decision agreed by the budget committees of the House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate also envisages the creation of an "emergency fund" the President can use if he finds any additional ways to replenish the treasury. A further sum of almost \$7 billion could be placed at the Defense Department's disposal thanks to this fund.

It must also be taken into account that the Pentagon already has at its disposal very large residues of funds allocated in previous years' budgets to militarist programs whose implementation goes beyond a single fiscal year. The press has cited data to the effect that such "residues" amount to \$142 billion. Consequently, in the next fiscal year the U.S. Defense Department will have at its disposal \$430-440 billion it will be able to use to further intensify the arms race and accelerate militarist preparations.

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL has reported on some Pentagon programs that will be implemented thanks to new appropriations. It is a question of purchases of 216 F-16 aircraft, 48 F-15's, and 120 F-18's. It is planned to acquire 840 M1 Abrams tanks and 870 Bradley armored personnel carriers.

These are some rough outlines in the sphere of equipping the U.S. Armed Forces with so-called "conventional" arms. It goes without saying that paramount attention is devoted to further strengthening strategic offensive arms. The Reagan administration's decision to cease observing SALT II, a report by the Washington Center on Budget and Military Priorities [name as published] points out, will enable the Pentagon to considerably expand the present strategic arms buildup programs, deploy an additional 320 MX ICBM's 336 B-1B strategic bombers, and 4 Ohio-class nuclear submarines before 1996, purchase a further 144 Trident II (D-5) missiles for submarines over and above the planned level, and also suspend the dismantling of nuclear Poseidon submarines. This will require an increase of almost \$130 billion in the U.S. military budget. A Pentagon spokesman has also reported that the U.S. military department is preparing for the future a draft annual 3-percent increase in spending on the military. It has also been reported that during the same period it is planned to increase the American nuclear arsenal by 20,000 warheads.

Appropriations for implementing the "star wars" program are being allocated on an ever increasing scale.

The Senate Armed Services Committee of the U.S. Congress has approved the allocation of \$3.95 billion for these purposes in 1987. (Let us recall that \$1.4 billion was allocated to implementing SDI in fiscal 1985, and \$2.7 billion in 1986). This increase in spending on the "Strategic Defense Initiative" is connected with the U.S. intentions to carry out approximately 600 missile launches over 3 years and to create within the ABM system 3,200 combat stations with missiles deployed in 40 different orbits around the earth. This shows that the Reagan administration is firmly putting its efforts to implement the plans in the SDI sphere onto a practical footing.

It was no coincidence that Lieutenant General J. Abrahamson, director of the organization to implement the "Strategic Defense Initiative," declared in a report to Congress: "The organization to implement SDI is advancing with a specific, purposeful program aimed at supporting key national policy decisions." While expounding the main directions in which developments [razrabotki] are being made with a view to creating [sozdaniye] a strike complex of an ABM system with space-based elements, at the same time Abrahamson frankly admitted that the United States does not intend to abandon the creation [sozdaniye] of new types of offensive nuclear arms. "In the next few years," he writes in his report, "offensive nuclear forces and the prospect of inflicting a nuclear counterstrike will remain key elements of our nuclear deterrence strategy. Therefore we must preserve modern, flexible, and reliable offensive strategic and tactical nuclear forces." A very noteworthy admission, which essentially totally demolishes the false propaganda capers of apologists for the "star wars" program, who maintain that its realization will lead to the elimination of nuclear arms.

In light of these facts the alarm aroused by the U.S. Administration's actions both in the United States itself, as shown by the discussion of the draft military budget in Congress, and among U.S. allies, not to mention the world public, is understandable. The militarist programs on which Washington is lavishing trillions of dollars with a generous hand show that the U.S. ruling circles and the Reagan administration continue to come out from their former positions in the international arena. They are seeking to further exacerbate tension in the world by stepping up the arms race, above all the nuclear arms race. The United States refuses to embark on the path of curbing this race, preventing its spread into space, and ending nuclear tests. It evades a constructive response to the major Soviet foreign policy initiatives. There are increasing manifestations of the imperialist policy of force and of gross interference in other states' internal affairs. Through Washington's fault the peoples' hopes of real steps toward disarmament and a return to detente -- hopes engendered by the Soviet-American summit meeting in Geneva and by the principled accords reached there -- are still not being justified.

It is in this sense that we say that the policy of the U.S. ruling circles is mirrored, as it were, in the volume and structure of the American military budget. The more aggressive and adventurist this policy, the greater the appropriations for militarist purposes. The higher the level of military spending, the more dangerous Washington's practical actions in various regions of the globe.

You might think it is easy to understand that problems of international life must now be solved by military means. All current political problems, however complex and difficult they may be, must be solved by political means alone. Otherwise there could be a worldwide catastrophe. However, the position of the present federal leadership of the United States, as well as a number of other leading capitalist states, continues to be characterized by a reluctance to look at the realities of the modern world and to perceive the new philosophy of international security displayed by the Soviet Union.

Washington continues to proceed from the premise that the restrictions imposed by agreements and accords with the USSR only hinder the unrestrained arms buildup and the achievement of the longed-for military superiority over the Soviet Union.

The arms race makes fabulously large profits for the monopolies producing weapons and military hardware and for the military-industrial complex, and this is one of the main reasons why new mountains of weapons are piling up. This has once again been reflected in the latest U.S. military budget.

Under these conditions the Soviet Union persistently continues to counter the dangerous U.S. course with its own consistent policy of forming international relations that accord with the nature of our nuclear and space age. This was expressed in the concept elaborated by the 27th CPSU Congress of creating an all-embracing system of international security, and in a number of proposals submitted by the Soviet Union with a view to ending the arms race and going over to real disarmament.

Will Washington heed the voice of reason?

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RELATED ISSUES

USSR TALK SHOW: TEST BAN, UK-USSR TALKS, CDE, PACT PROPOSALS

LD202138 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1130 GMT 20 Jul 86

["International Observers Round Table" program with Rudolf Georgiyevich Kolchanov, deputy chief editor of TRUD; Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Lebedev, member of the NOVOYE VREMYA editorial board; and Aleksandr Vladimirovich Zholkver, Central Television and All-Union Radio political observer]

[Excerpt] [Zholkver] Hello, comrades. Important events in political life last week were the international forum of scientists in Moscow and the meeting of its representatives with Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. As you know, comrades, the forum participants, major scientists from 32 countries, unanimously spoke out for an end to nuclear tests. This theme seems doubly topical to me, inasmuch as the United States last Thursday -- or more accurately, on the night of Thursday to Friday -- carried out another underground blast at its nuclear test site in Nevada. This is the 7th already this year and the 14th since our country stopped all nuclear blasts.

Rudolf Georgiyevich, you visited the United States not so long ago; How do you explain this, to put it mildly, odious position of Washington?

[Kolchanov] I would like, first of all, to make a small digression into history: It is all the more essential since 6 August is the 41st anniversary of the first atomic bombing. I think that our listeners also know perfectly well that the use of Fat Man and Little Boy, the first atomic monsters, was not at all called for by any military reasons. Soviet soldiers, having defeated the Kwantung Army, had practically predetermined Japan's capitulation, and of course, there was no need for the use of this super-weapon, especially against the civilian population. Washington saw atomic bombs as a means for altering the world to its fashion on the model of a Pax Americana. It saw them as a means of asserting its supremacy over the planet, which had not yet recovered from the adversities of the war.

The bomb was not only meant for political blackmail, but also for practical use for a direct purpose, and the first and main opponent was the Soviet Union. I will recall the directive from the Chiefs of Staff of 20 September 1945. It gave the order to keep mobile strike forces on alert, ensuring rapid and effective action. As you see, the directive itself is not very specific, but Plan No 329 of 3 November 1945 as well already defined the directive specifically and envisaged the selection of approximately 20 of the most important targets suitable for strategic atomic bombing in the USSR and on the territory it controlled.

You can imagine it: the end of 1945, the military cannonade has just died down, the ashes have just settled on the soil of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the tears of the relatives and friends of the 20 million Soviet people who died as victims of Hitlerism have

not yet dried, and Washington is working out in detail a plan for the atomic destruction of the Soviet Union. I must recall here that the United States has brandished the big atomic stick more than once against various countries. In 1953, General Bradley, addressing a senate foreign affairs commission -- this address caused a lot of noise at the time -- said: We have discussed many times the possibility of the tactical use of the atomic bomb in the Korean War as soon as a suitable target is chosen. The year 1956: the United States threatens the use of military weapons during the Suez crisis. The year 1973: at the time of the Arab-Israeli war, nuclear combat readiness is called for in the U.S. Armed Forces. The year 1980: The Pentagon plans a nuclear bombing on Iran.

But, the main target has remained the Soviet Union; naturally, we have not been able to watch the growing threat with indifference. The USSR has created [sozdal] adequate weapons capable of holding back the forces of imperialism from the adventure of striving for world supremacy. In so doing -- and this is highly important -- unlike U.S. imperialism, the Soviet Union has never threatened the use of weapons of mass destruction against anyone.

[Zholkver] Rudolf Georgiyevich, as I understand it, the most important place in this historical digression has been taken up by the global plans of U.S. imperialism.

[Kolchanov] Precisely. These plans were born not just now or all of a sudden, they were born in the very first postwar.

[Zhoskver] But it seems to me it would be incorrect if, on a level with these geopolitical interests of U.S. imperialism, we did not also take into account its military-industrial interests. I refer to the activity of the U.S. military-industrial complex, for which the production of nuclear weapons is the most profitable business, and I would say particularly so at the moment. After all, the point is that the latest reports in the U.S. economic press and the latest events on the New York stock exchange are evidence of a certain instability in the United States' present economic situation. New indications of a fall in growth rates have been registered.

Last year the volume of retail sales in the United States -- this is an important index -- showed an increase of only 0.2 percent. The volume of production at factories, mines, and other enterprises in the country fell in June for the fourth time in the past 5 months. Well, this is without mentioning the fall of shares on the stock exchange, and not just for 1-day. This was going on all last week, and the U.S. budget deficit is not declining and the foreign trade deficit is increasing. All this has evoked definite anxiety from the major U.S. companies. I saw a large article in THE NEW YORK TIMES on this issue, where it is noted that the new situation, it seems, is influencing profits, and the story that follows is very interesting: The military industry, which in the past few years felt unusually well, obtaining profits on share capital that are 50 percent higher than average for the country -- this is what military orders yield -- has announced disappointing profits for the first quarter of 1986. So, apprehensions have appeared to the effect that these absolutely record profits the military industries obtain may, for all I know, decrease. And how do the companies respond to this? The same article in THE NEW YORK TIMES notes that the companies, leading ones such as General Dynamics, Lockheed, and Boeing, are amalgamating and concluding cartel agreements, and there is a real hunt on for military orders. The most important military orders are for the production of nuclear weapons and military space arms. It seems to me that one of the reasons Washington is so stubbornly ignoring world public opinion, the opinion of its own country, and the opinion of its own scientists who caution against a continuation of the nuclear arms race, is the urge not to allow just the elimination, but even any reduction in the huge profits connected with space weapons production.

[Lebedev] I agree with you, Aleksandr Vladimirovich. Since we started talking about this subject of nuclear tests and the continuing blasts in Nevada, then, the military-industrial complex and this oligarchy, this financial, military, and militaristic oligarchy in the United States, are undoubtedly the root of all evil and the initiators of the continuing nuclear arms race. This is an exact reflection of an old approach, which is already obsolete in international politics as we said in our nuclear space missile age -- that is, it is an attempt, with the aid of this new technology, with SDI, the star wars program -- because these nuclear blasts are obviously being used precisely for improving the development of the SDI program -- with the aid of this, to still achieve the same thing, that same redundant dream of world supremacy.

[Zholkver] Which they were dreaming about as far back as the first postwar months and years.

[Lebedev] Exactly. Even so, here in this picture that is already so negative, I would also like to find a definite positive point. Let us say, 6 months ago, terms such as -- the necessity for a new political way of thinking -- who used them? You know that Soviet leader Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev used them. They are entered in the political report to the 27th congress, and currently we see that they have already started talking about a new political way of thinking, and the urgent, and pressing necessity for it throughout the world.

Now the International Forum of Scientists for a Nuclear Test Ban took place in Moscow this week, and there I had occasion to hear a speech by a very famous and authoritative scientist -- on the whole, very prominent and authoritative figures were gathered there, many of them were later received by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev -- and one of the first to speak was a professor at Princeton University, Frank von Hippel.

The very first sentences that he uttered were that on this issue of testing nuclear weapons, there are indeed two different approaches to world affairs which manifest themselves. This is the old political way of thinking and the new political way of thinking. He said only that it was precisely the fact that the Soviet Union has unilaterally maintained its moratorium on testing nuclear weapons for almost a year that is evidence of, indeed, a new political way of thinking. This idea has also been entered into the declaration which the participants adopted; it literally says that to achieve this aim to stop nuclear tests and eliminate nuclear weapons, a new way of thinking is needed. The Soviet Union's unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests is a most important demonstration of this new thinking, opening up unique opportunities for a comprehensive nuclear test ban. The scientists hope that the United States on its part will also make the same decision on a moratorium.

Here, strictly speaking, is a characteristic and clear example of a very influential public opinion group's assessment of the policy which is being carried out by our country, and, I think that this theme of a new political way of thinking has something in common with many of our other initiatives. The point here, so to speak, is that it does not just come to the problem of nuclear tests, because at the moment in Europe and in West Europe -- I want to stress this -- this trend toward a realization of the necessity for a new political way of thinking and an understanding of the interconnection of the modern world, with all its contradictions, of course manifests itself very clearly and specifically and we see this in recent events.

[Zholkver] Yes. This also came out, in my opinion, during our foreign minister, Comrade Zhevardnadze's visit to London, which took place this week, and the talks that were held with the British leaders, and the Soviet-British agreements signed there. I'll remind

you that among them was a program for the development of our economic cooperation over the next 5 years, and a not unimportant agreement on preventing incidents at sea. I have in mind not only the fact that Britain, as is known, is a major sea power, but also that this agreement could become the forerunner -- as Eduard Amvorsiyevich put it -- of agreements on more important questions. On the preventing of the most terrible incident that can happen, a nuclear catastrophe.

[Kolchanov] And the visit of our foreign minister, Comrade Shevardnadze, is itself a development of the Soviet-British dialogue initiated back in 1984 by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. Interestingly, practically the whole of the British press assesses the outcome of the talks very favorably. I can quote the FINANCIAL TIMES. It writes that the talks have marked the beginning of a stage of thaw in Anglo-Soviet relations, which have been frozen for a long time. The same paper, quoting British officials, stresses that the Anglo-Soviet talks were conducted in detail, constructively, and in a relaxed atmosphere. Well, knowing the British reserve, knowing how slow they are to express their emotions, and bearing in mind, indeed, what Soviet-British relations have been like until recently, one should regard this as quite a favorable assessment.

[Zholkver] Well, as for our assessment, it was given at the Politburo session where Comrade Shevardnadze's report on the results of his visit to Great Britain was discussed. The Politburo noted that those talks and conversations and the agreements that were signed are an important step in continuing the political dialogue between the two countries, the development of their mutually beneficial relations, and cooperation in matters on which there exist between the sides points of contiguity and a shared interest in lowering international tension and strengthening peace.

[Lebedev] Here I think one should not forget -- and we do not forget -- another very important aspect of the Soviet-British talks, which is their, as it were, international and European, pan-European, aspect. Taken together with the recent visit by French President Mitterrand, this visit and these talks with the British leaders have shown, in general, that there is a growing realization that the whole of Europe is one community.

[Kolchanov] Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, as Shevardnadze said at the press conference, we note the realism and the rational approach of the British side, which has definitely expressed itself in favor of observing the existing Soviet-U.S. treaties -- SALT I, SALT II and ABM -- in favor of progress at the Geneva talks on nuclear and space armaments, in other words, what you have said about general world problems, and, in particular, European problems.

[Lebedev] Yes, quite right. There is a new awareness not only of the possibility, but also of the necessity that Europe, with its 700 million inhabitants, should play an independent role in world affairs and international politics. And...

[Kolchanov interrupting] With its accumulated experience, positive experience...

[Lebedev] Both negative and positive, yes.

[Kolchanov] Since the seventies, the experience has clearly positive, while the past decades and centuries provided negative experience, which is also experience.

[Lebedev] Of course the Europeans have a foundation on which to rely. This tendency toward strengthening, so to speak, both an independent Europe as a whole, and particular states -- large, medium, and small European states -- toward strengthening their independent role in world politics, this tendency is now being manifested in a very tangible

way, and it is positive. Here one should not be looking for -- as again certain of the mass media both across the ocean and in Western Europe do, all the time, harping on these famous wedges that Moscow is supposedly trying to drive into relations in NATO and relations between the allies on both sides of the Atlantic. Here is a rather interesting statement I will quote, by a fairly well-informed person, General Rogers, supreme allied commander, Europe. He recently said that he finds there is presently far stronger anti-European feeling in the United States than at any time during his 7 years in Europe, and stronger anti-American feeling here in Europe than he has ever seen as he put it. So there is no need to invent or seek any wedges other than those that the Americans themselves are driving into their transatlantic relations. The positive element of this, as it were, is the European individuality and independence that is now being manifested. This, I think, is a very important sign.

[Zholkver] I think it also comes out in this decisive stage of the Stockholm conference. The latest session of this Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Security and Disarmament in Europe ended this week; it is now in recess.

[Kolchanov] September is not far off.

[Zholkver] The next session, the last one before the Vienna meeting, will be held from 19 September. It should be said, as was also noted by the head of our delegation in Stockholm, that in the past few days there has been an important breakthrough at the conference. They have succeeded in untying one of the tight knots, as he called them, that have for a long time been holding up progress: the problem of notification of air force exercises. A considerable common basis can be discerned on the question of exercises by land forces as well. I should remind you that at the London talks also, the common approach of the Soviet Union and Britain to the need for a successful conclusion of the Stockholm Conference was emphasized. You were speaking, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, of the visit by President Mitterrand to our country. During those talks, too, the necessity of bringing Stockholm to a successful conclusion was emphasized; so, Europe can do a lot to improve the situation in what you rightly called our common European home.

[Lebedev] These questions, Aleksandr Vladimirovich, that you have touched on are connected with the Stockholm Conference, and, by the way, with the Vienna talks on reducing armed forces and armaments in Central Europe.

Every time, the howl goes up from the western side over verification, that we are supposedly resisting these verification measures. We began today's discussion with the question of nuclear tests. Well, what more vivid and convincing example could there be of our willingness to agree to the most effective and far-reaching verification measures, than when we acted first in allowing U.S. scientists to install seismic equipment near Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan in order to record any phenomena that could possibly arouse, let us assume, suspicion on the part of the Americans, who in the previous period were claiming, without a shred of evidence, that during the underground explosions permitted by the treaty, power levels were exceeded and so on. The U.S. scientists are working with that equipment. We are helping them. They are not being obstructed. They were invited, and we are helping them.

[Kolchanov] On verification we have far-reaching concrete proposals. We are willing to have verification in laboratories that are connected in one way or another with projects [razrabotki] in the sphere of space. At the Vienna talks on conventional armaments we also are willing to accept far-reaching verification, concrete verification, but verification of disarmament, and not verification of armament.

[Zholkver] And not of the carrying out of nuclear tests...

[Kolchanov, interrupting]... as the United States originally proposed to us. You remember, in reply to our first announcement of a moratorium, the United States invited us to participate during tests. What we want is not control of armament, but disarmament under effective control. That is our position, and what you said, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, indeed applies to a great many spheres, and practically all spheres of disarmament, whatever you are talking about, from space to earth, and even lower.

[Zholkver] Of course, this comes up not against the issues of verification, this comes up against the very same manifestations of the policy of neoglobalism and striving for world domination, with which, strictly speaking, you, Rudolf Georgiyevich, started our conversation today. I think, it may be continued with examples of events that occurred this week in Latin America. I have in mind, first of all, the anniversary of the victory of the Sandinist Revolution. It is fairly well known how long the United States supported its protege in Nicaragua, Dictator Somoza, before he was overthrown. As a matter of fact, now, the current Washington policy toward Nicaragua is a relapse of that former policy, it is the continuation of that former policy...

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RELATED ISSUES

SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY PRESS CONFERENCE ON SALT, TEST BAN

PM221911 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Jul 86 Morning Edition p 5

[Unattributed report under "At the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center" rubric: "For a Constructive Approach"]

[Text] At a meeting with Soviet and foreign journalists on 21 July, G.I. Gerasimov, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Administration [upravleniye], informed the mass news media representatives about the official visit to the USSR by H.-D. Genscher, FRG federal vice chancellor and federal foreign minister, which has just begun, and about his reception by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

In connection with the special session of the Soviet-American Standing Consultative Commission opening 22 July, the USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman made the following announcement:

The American side has agreed to the Soviet side's proposal to hold an extraordinary session of the Standing Consultative Commission.

We intend to raise serious questions concerning the political and strategic consequences of the Reagan administration's decision of 27 May this year on U.S. withdrawal from the 1972 Interim Agreement on limiting Offensive Strategic Arms [SALT I] and the 1979 treaty on Limiting Offensive Strategic Arms [SALT II].

The Soviet side proceeds from the premise that everything positive that has been achieved in the sphere of the limitation and reduction of nuclear armaments must be preserved. The sides' continued observance of the SALT II treaty would contribute to the maintenance of the global balance of forces and the strengthening of security.

The USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman also announced a forthcoming meeting of Soviet and American experts on the question of ending nuclear tests.

To resolve the problem of nuclear weapon tests, he said, it is necessary to work out an understanding whereby such tests would be banned under international law. We have repeatedly proposed embarking immediately on the elaboration of such an understanding.

In March of this year the Soviet Union proposed to the United States starting bilateral talks on this question and announced that A.M. Petrosyants, chairman of the USSR State Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy, had been appointed head of the Soviet delegation at the relevant talks.

Until recently the United States has striven to reduce the entire question of nuclear tests to the verification [kontrol] of nuclear explosions alone. In the course of bilateral diplomatic contacts it has been possible to reach agreement that, starting 25 July, the sides will hold talks between experts in Geneva on the entire range of questions -- on verification [kontrol] and on determining of ways of completely renouncing nuclear tests.

This formulation, the USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman observed, takes account of both sides' positions and orients the talks toward the achievement of an effective understanding on the halting and banning of all nuclear tests.

The Soviet delegation will be headed by A.M. Petrosyants.

Answers were given to journalists' questions, and it was particularly stressed that the siting of American seismographical equipment in the Semipalatinsk region was still further evidence of the USSR's political goodwill, its readiness to assist the creation of an atmosphere of confidence, and its desire to put an end to nuclear tests.

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RELATED ISSUES

PRAVDA COMMENTATOR SEES EUROPEAN-U.S. 'ALIENATION' GROWING

PM181131 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Jul 86 First Edition p 5

[Vladimir Mikhaylov "Commentator's Column": "Drifting to Nowhere"]

[Text] The distance between America and Europe is continuing to grow. Not in kilometers, but in degree of alienation. "The anti-American sentiments here in Western Europe have intensified more than ever before." That conclusion was drawn not by just anyone, but by General D. Rogers himself, supreme commander of NATO allied armed forces in Europe.

This phenomenon has been observed for a long time. But this is probably the first time that its true causes have been mentioned so openly by a high-ranking Washington representative. The cause is named as "the Europeans' shock at the decision taken unilaterally by the United States to use NATO resources to inflict a strike on a territory (Libya -- V.M.) outside the bloc's defense system."

The second cause, in the general's exposition, is no less serious: "Agreements in the arms reduction sphere always hold a very important place among the priority problems for the West Europeans... Many people in Western Europe do not think the United States is seriously trying to achieve accords on arms control and arms reduction at the talks."

The American general's admissions have special weight not only by virtue of his authority. The point is that according to the official Washington story the dissociation of the allies from the United States is the work of "perfidious Moscow." Many of the USSR's peace proposals -- for instance, on the elimination of American and Soviet medium-range nuclear missiles and on reducing the two powers' armed forces and armaments -- have been dismissed out of hand as the desire to "drive a wedge" between the United States and Europe. Now the absurdity of this mendacity is confirmed even by the American side.

Why was Rogers so frank? Perhaps the information about sentiments in Western Europe prompted him to warn Washington? No, there has not been a miracle. The general insistently advised the European partners to "step up cooperation in arms production and the development of an independent program" like the American "star wars". In general, if it was possible for Western Europe to be infected by the madness of superarmaments, this common "passion" would bring the allies closer together again.

Meanwhile, it is not only in the European headquarters of Nato that phenomena have been observed which are dangerous to the American supporters of confrontation. The phenomenon of "estrangement" from the United States can be observed on other continents too.

The evidence is the results of a public opinion poll in 21 countries. Apart from Western Europe, the poll took place in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Some 78 percent of those polled assessed the need for the signing of a U.S.-USSR arms control treaty as an "important" or "very important" objective.

So the intensification of Washington's self-isolation is guaranteed if it continues its militarist "drifting to nowhere." Isolation not only in the outside world. Even within the United States the conclusion of an arms reduction treaty is considered "very important" by 62 percent of the population.

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RELATED ISSUES

SOVIET ARTICLE ON MITTERRAND VISIT, REPERCUSSIONS

PM171551 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 13 Jul 86 p 3

[Article by G. Dadyants: "Place de la Bastille Symbols"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] These lines are being written after the Soviet-French summit. The conversations that took place in Moscow between CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev and French President F. Mitterrand took place in a spirit of sincerity and a desire for mutual understanding, in an atmosphere of that lofty responsibility for European and international security and for the state of Soviet-French relations that rests on the two countries' leaders. [passage omitted]

The USSR and France agreed that the accords that curb the arms race and prevent it from spreading to other spheres must not be destroyed. The press uses the term "fields of mutual understanding between Moscow and Paris" to describe the desire to avoid an arms race in space and France's concern about U.S. intentions not to observe in the future the provisions of the Soviet-American SALT II treaty and the ABM Treaty.

The USSR took note of F. Mitterrand's words to the effect that Europe must once again take the "leading role in its own history" and could play its part as a "factor of equilibrium and stability in international relations." This view of Europe is close to the viewpoint expressed in this connection by M.S. Gorbachev. "Europe," the CPSU Central Committee general secretary said at the dinner in honor of F. Mitterrand, "has a big enough economic and political potential to be able to speak for itself more clearly and more confidently and to achieve progress at all the talks currently under way."

The USSR and France, acting together or in parallel, can do a great deal in the interests of the entire continent. Especially now that it is so essential to step up the all-European process, ensure the successful and fruitful conclusion of the Stockholm conference, and prepare properly for the Vienna meeting.

In general, collaboration between the USSR and France makes it easier to place international relations on a healthy footing that demands new thinking and an awareness of the interdependence of states in the modern era, taking each state's interests into account. In the sphere of bilateral relations our countries are supposed to set an example of peaceful coexistence and mutually advantageous cooperation in all spheres -- from industrial cooperation and the organization of joint production facilities to nuclear power and joint space research.

Our continent must not be seen as a theater of hostilities, it must be a model of peaceful coexistence among states with different social systems -- this is the chief conclusion or, to put it another way, the "political credo" of this Soviet-French meeting.

Of course, the positions of the USSR and France do not coincide on certain international or political issues. They also have different ideas on a number of basic human values, which is due to different sociopolitical systems and features of their historical development. But they can and must cooperate fruitfully in the interests of our peoples who are attracted to one another and have traditional friendly feelings toward one another.

Let us hope that France's independent foreign policy that the French president talked about in Moscow will contribute to the attainment of these goals. [passage omitted]

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RELATED ISSUES

IZVESTIYA CORRESPONDENT VIEWS UK DISARMAMENT POLICY

PM150855 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Jul 86 Morning Edition pp 4, 5

[Own correspondent A. Krivopalov article: "Seeking a New Approach"]

[Excerpts] London -- [passage omitted] What is Britain's role in world politics in general and in European politics in particular? Thoughts on this subject concern, or rather perturb broad circles of the British public. The alliance with the United States which, from the political viewpoint, probably appears natural to the majority of British people, now generates serious fears from the military viewpoint. Even Conservative circles felt somewhat embarrassed and annoyed because the Reagan administration, disregarding the opinion of its NATO allies, announced its refusal to observe SALT II. Both specialists and people without any specialized knowledge in military and disarmament affairs in Britain ponder with growing alarm: How far can the arms race reach now that the United States intends to extend it to space, and what must be done to erect a reliable barrier here?

The Soviet peace initiatives, primarily the program mapping out the ways to nuclear disarmament even before the end of this century and the USSR's other proposals in the sphere of terminating the arms race, are forcing official London to engage in a dialogue with the USSR on this subject.

Moreover, it must not be forgotten that positive experience has been accumulated in relations between our countries regarding discussions of various international problems of considerable importance.

It is possible to recall, for example, the talks on banning nuclear weapon tests in the three environments or on the imposition of a prohibition of chemical weapons. Our positions drew closer on these matters. It must have been completely logical and obvious for the British people, who had not consigned this to oblivion, to ask: How about now; is London incapable of furthering progress in the cause of disarmament, and primarily in the implementation of an all-embracing treaty banning all nuclear tests? In what way can London's privileged relations with Washington have a specific influence on Britain's transatlantic partner? Something else: Do the colossal U.S. nuclear arsenal stationed in the British Isles and even its own "deterrent force" ensure Britain's security?

I have had opportunities to speak on these subjects with people holding different views and different positions. For example, I had a lengthy conversation with one member of the House of Lords, an eminent specialist on defense matters, who attempted to prove that, in the first place, Britain cannot but improve its nuclear potential since the Polaris missiles are becoming obsolete and must be replaced, and second, that it apparently cannot claim the role of a great power without such "deterrent means." It is easy to guess that we had an argument. In the end, my interlocutor was forced to admit -- somewhat reluctantly, it is true -- that the Trident program, as planned, envisages (he was extremely modest in his estimates) the threefold increase of the existing arsenals of British nuclear weapons.

More and more people in Britain are becoming aware of the simple truth: No single state in today's world can any longer expect to defend itself only with military-technical means. To ensure security has become primarily a political task, and it must be resolved by political means. "What is needed is goodwill in order to solve the problem of curbing the arms race," I was told by D. Davies, defense spokesman in the Labor Party's "shadow cabinet." "Our party supports the Soviet idea of moratorium on nuclear weapon tests and on the creation [sozdaniye], production, and deployment of new weapon systems. The decision on this must be made immediately. The question concerning the control [kontrol] of tests had arisen earlier in the course of the relevant talks. This is no longer a problem. It is sufficient that authoritative scientists assert: Technological development ensures accuracy and veracity of control [proverka]. Peace cannot be secure as long as nuclear weapons exist. The sooner talks begin on the entire package of proposals that have been put forward, the better. Britain must assist this by all means. This is the Labor Party's stance."

The forces that rely on the military preparations race and are organically hostile to the cause of peaceful cooperation between countries in the West and the East continue their dangerous and unworthy activity in the British Isles, contrary to Britain's national and state interests. Thinking in obsolete terms, they proceed like always from the premise that they can subjugate the country's public opinion by spreading fear and slander. Hence there is no end to the anti-Soviet campaign, whose murky waves are meant to close the eyes of the British people, who are in any case experiencing a shortage of truthful information about life in the USSR, let alone the goals of Soviet policy. Yet, no matter how diligent the adversaries of detente and good neighborliness in our continent may be, their potential is shrinking.
[passage omitted]

Awareness of the need for changes in the world arena, for a new thinking, and for a new approach toward fundamental international problems that demand immediate, specific, and extensive examination, is making its way in the British Isles. This is why people here welcomed with gratification the news of the forthcoming London visit by E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister. Most diverse circles in the country express the opinion that the forthcoming talks will help to improve relations between our two countries and will serve the cause of strengthening peace and security in Europe and everywhere on earth.

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RELATED ISSUES

USSR'S RYZHKOV GREETES SCIENTIFIC SYMPOSIUM IN MOSCOW

LD210927 Moscow TASS in English 0915 GMT 21 Jul 86

[Quotation marks as received]

[Text] Moscow July 21 TASS -- Follows full text of Nikolay Ryzhkov's message of greetings to international symposium:

"To the participants in the international symposium 'Science, Technology and Peace' and in the 14th General Assembly of the World Federation of Scientific Workers.

I greet the members of the international scientific community who have gathered in Moscow to attend the symposium 'Science, Technology and Peace' and the 14th General Assembly of the World Federation of Scientific Workers.

Your symposium and assembly are taking place at a time which is complex to the world. In which condition mankind enters the third millenium will depend in many respects on the solution of the existing global problems, among which the issues of war and peace have been placed at the centre of international life by the very course of history."

"The current disquieting situation calls for a resolute intensification of the struggle for the prevention of a new world war. The arms race which is threatening to run out of control erodes stability, undermines universal and national security, and raises the problem of civilization's survival with utmost urgency."

"In the interests of fundamentally improving the international situation and ridding mankind of the threat of a nuclear catastrophe, the USSR has undertaken major steps for the positive line which began to show at the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Geneva to be embodied in concrete actions. Our peace initiatives are aimed at implementing a comprehensive programme of international security which reflects the vital interests of the international community."

"Scientists' special responsibility for the destiny of mankind and for the preservation of peace and very life on earth has been mentioned more than once. I would like to emphasise again that today as never before it is required that scientists multiply their contribution to the common efforts which are called upon to keep mankind from perishing in a nuclear conflagration. What will the human intellect be directed to -- to the release of the great forces of creation or to the development of new, still more dangerous systems of destruction -- an answer to this question depends to a large extent on scientists."

"The World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW), which was founded on the initiative of the outstanding scientists, Frederic Joliot-Curie and John Bernal, makes a substantial contribution to the effort to assert the lofty ideals of peace and mutual understanding. It has done a good deal for the intellectual potential of science to be used for the benefit of peace, progress and development, with a view to solving the global problems mankind is faced with."

"The active anti-war stand of the WFSW and its valuable research into the problems of disarmament serve as a platform for uniting broad sections of scientific workers in mankind's struggle against the nuclear threat."

"Availing myself of the opportunity, I wholeheartedly congratulate the World Federation of Scientific Workers on its 40th Jubilee.

I wish the WFSW fruitful work and new successes in the development of international cooperation of scientists in the name of solving the acutest problems of our time and, first of all, in the name of establishing on earth a secure world without wars and weapons."

[Signed] Nikolay Ryzhkov,

Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR".

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CSO: 5200/1487

RELATED ISSUES

GROMYKO DISCUSSES ARMS ISSUES WITH WOMEN'S ANTIWAR DELEGATION

LD231928 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1558 GMT 23 Jul 86

[Text] Moscow, 23 Jul (TASS) -- A.A. Gromyko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, received in the Kremlin today prominent figures of the women's antiwar movement, who are in Moscow at the invitation of the Soviet Women's Committee.

Among the guests were Mirjan Vire-Tuominen, winner of the International Lenin Prize for strengthening peace among people and general secretary of the Women's International Democratic Federation; Jadwiga Biedrzycka, vice marshal of the Sejm of the Polish Peoples Republic; (Helga Henrich), member of the leadership of the list in defense of peace organization, FRG; Amarjit Kaur, member of the leadership of the Indian National Congress Party and member of the Indian Parliament; Nancy MacDonald, member of the Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party of Canada; (Zili Sakellaridi), president of the Federation of Greek Women; Elizabeth Tehbs, chairman of the National Assembly of Women, Great Britain.

Responding to a wish expressed by the women participating in the conversation, A.A. Gromyko described how the Soviet Union envisaged the implementation of the program for the step-by-step elimination of nuclear weapons by the end of the present century, as put forward in the statement by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, on 15 January this year.

In order to begin this process, he said the first step needs to be taken; in other words talks need to be held with the United States. Unfortunately, Washington has not yet given a positive reply to the Soviet proposals.

We consider the state of Soviet-American relations to be poor, he continued. By comparison with the level attained when former administrations were in office, the present level of political, trade, and cultural relations has been considerably reduced, and in certain spheres it has been almost reduced to nothing.

Furthermore, the American Administration has announced that it intends to renounce compliance with very important Soviet-American accords: the 1972 treaty limiting anti-ballistic missile systems (ABM), the 1972 Interim Agreement limiting Offensive Strategic Armaments (SALT I), and the 1979 treaty on limiting offensive strategic armaments (SALT II).

In these circumstances, antiwar movements, particularly the women's antiwar movement, could make a substantial contribution to the struggle for peace if they were to

intensify their action in support of calls for compliance with these important accords. Much depends on the vigor of the actions of public organizations which take an anti-militarist stand and pursue antiwar activity, opening people's eyes to who is really to blame for the dangerous situation that has arisen in the world.

Figuratively speaking, if everyone were to stamp their feet together, this would be heard even by those who until now have not wanted to hear, A.A. Gromyko said.

Replying to the corresponding wishes of the leading figures of women's antiwar movement, he also explained the sense of the concept of the new political thinking, which is required from people in the present nuclear age and revealed the content of the Soviet concept of an all-embracing system of international security, put forward by the 27th CPSU Congress.

It has been known for a long time that mankind does not set itself insoluble tasks, A.A. Gromyko stressed in conclusion. Also now facing it are those aims it is capable of achieving and for the achievement of which it possesses the appropriate potential.

M. Vire-Tuominen noted that the Democratic Women's Movement highly assesses the policy of peace the Soviet Union is pursuing and supports its peaceloving initiatives. She also told of the preparations for the world women's congress, which will be held in Moscow in June 1987 under the motto "Toward the year 2000 without nuclear weapons -- for peace, equality and development."

Participating in the conversation which was held in a warm, cordial atmosphere were: Hero of the Soviet Union V.V. Tereshkova, chairman of the Soviet Women's Committee; and K.S. Proskurnikova, deputy chairman of the same committee.

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RELATED ISSUES

BRIEFS

GORBACHEV MESSAGE TO WORLD LEADERS--Moscow, 15 July TASS--At a briefing here today, Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the Information Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, drew journalists' attention to the fundamental provisions and aims of the Soviet peace proposals. "At present," he said, "special envoys of the USSR are being sent out to many countries to deliver an oral message from Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), to the heads of state and government". "Their aim is to emphasize the importance of solving the problems of disarmament at an earliest date while a war-starting decision is still taken by the leaders of states, and not by computers", Gennadiy Gerasimov emphasized. Special envoys who are authorized to deliver the oral message will also explain the contents of the Soviet peace proposals and will answer questions that may arise regarding its contents. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 0947 GMT 15 Jul 86 LD] /12858

GORBACHEV MESSAGE TO NETHERLANDS--The Hague, 16 July TASS--Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR Vladimir Petrovskiy, now on an official working visit here, today handed over to Foreign Minister of the Netherlands Hans van den Broek a personal message to the Prime Minister of the Netherlands Rudolph Lubbers from General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev. Problems of disarmament and limitation of armaments, and also questions of mutual interest, were discussed during the talk. The Soviet representative held at the Foreign Ministry of the Netherlands consultations on the problems of international cooperation in peaceful uses of outer space and items on the agenda of the coming 41st session of the UN General Assembly. The two sides agreed on expanding bilateral political consultations. USSR Ambassador in the Netherlands Anatoliy Blatov took part in the talk and the consultations. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1713 GMT 16 Jul 86 LD] /12858

SOVIET MESSAGE TO BELGIUM--Brussels, 17 July TASS--Upon arrival here special envoy of the USSR, Ambassador at large Vladimir Lomeyko today communicated to Leo Tindemans, minister of external relations of Belgium, a verbal message from Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to the Belgian Government. The message deals with an early solution to disarmament problems. Lomeyko also held political consultations with the top officials of the Ministry of External Relations of Belgium on a wide range of problems dealing with the elimination of the threat of nuclear war, with the reduction of the level of nuclear confrontation and with disarmament. The Soviet envoy gave the Belgian side detailed explanations concerning the essence of the Soviet peace initiatives going in this direction. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1607 GMT 17 Jul 86 LD] /12858

SOVIET-AUSTRALIAN TALKS--Moscow, 18 July TASS--The Soviet-Australian bilateral consultations on disarmament were held in the USSR Foreign Ministry on 17-18 July. Main attention was given to problems of nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, prohibition of nuclear tests, peaceful development of nuclear power engineering, prohibition of chemical weapons, prevention of the arms race in space and the development of international cooperation in its peaceful explorations. The sides also examined questions of security in South Asia and in the Pacific. The Australian delegation headed by A.D. Campbell, deputy foreign minister, was received by V.F. Petrovskiy, USSR deputy foreign minister. E.R. Pocock, Australian ambassador to the USSR, participated in the consultations. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1957 GMT 18 Jul 86 LD] /12858

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